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When we believe it, we '1 see it.
Saul Alinsky'
The questions which one asks oneself begin, at last, to illuminate
the world, and become one's key to the experience of others.
James Baldwin2
L Introduction
On June 17, 1968, the very last day of the Warren Court, Justice Potter
Stewart delivered the majority opinion in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,3 a
case involving a black couple who alleged that they were denied an opportu-
nity to purchase a home in the Paddock Woods community of St. Louis
County solely because of their race.4 Interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment
and a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866' to prohibit not only govern-
mental discrimination, but also private discrimination in housing, Justice
Stewart declared:
Just as the Black Codes, enacted after the Civil War to restrict the free
exercise of those rights, were substitutes for the slave system, so the
exclusion of Negroes from white communities became a substitute for the
Black Codes. And when racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and
makes their ability to buy property turn on the color of their skin, then it
too is a relic of slavery.6
On that day, the Court empowered and liberally applied Supreme Court
precedent construing the Thirteenth Amendment to include "badges and
incidents of slavery,"7 and it constitutionally endorsed congressional power
1. Vincent Harding, Community as a Liberating Theme in Civil Rights History, in NEW
DIRCTIONS IN CIVIL RiotGrs 17,28 (Armstead L. Robinson & Patricia Sullivan eds., 1991).
2. James Baldwin, Nobody Knows My Name, in COLLECTED ESSAYS 130, 136 (The
Library of America 1998) (1961).
3. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
4. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 412 (1968) (noting that plaintiffs
sued defendants who allegedly refused to sell house to plaintiffs because they were black).
5. See Civil RightsAct of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994))
(providing that all citizens have same right enjoyed by whites to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property). As a result of the decision in Jones, this provision
does not require state action.
6. Jones, 392 U.S. at 442-43.
7. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
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to pass legislation that would enforce the Thirteenth Amendment." The Court
decided the case during a time of civil unrest and shortly after the assassination
of Martin Luther King, Jr., on April 4, 1968. One week after that traumatic
event, Congress passed the Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968." Complementing Title VIII, the Jones decision marked the beginning
of the modem era of fair housing, although the decision was met with strenuous
opposition - an example of "judicial activism run riot" in the view of North
Carolina's Senator Sam Ervin.10 Dissenting, Justice Harlan characterized the
decision as "most ill-considered and ill-advised."'" Indeed, "Jones was the only
Supreme Court civil rights decision of this period to come close to a congres-
sional override." 2
Far removed from those "riotous" jurisprudential times, this Article
explores the devastating metaphor of African Americans as "unwanted traffic."
I take this cultural construction from the Supreme Court's 1981 decision in
City ofMemphis v. Greene,3 in which the Court endorsed a street closing that
blocked traffic from a black neighborhood through a white one. 4 Thirteen
years after the final Warren Court term, a different Supreme Court took back
the empowerment, hope, and promise of the decision in Jones. '
8. Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 1, 1 n.1 (1995) (stating that Jones reaffirmed Congress's power under Thirteenth Amend-
ment to enforce laws aimed at preventing race discrimination).
9. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994)).
10. See Sam Ervin, Jr., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.: JudicialActivism Run Riot, 22
VAND. L. REv. 485, 501 (1969) (asserting that Jones decision was inconsistent with purposes
of Thirteenth Amendment and Civil Rights Act of 1866); see also Note, The "New" Thirteenth
Amendment: PreliminaryAnalysis, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1294, 1320-21 (1969) (criticizing Court
for unnecessarily creating new constitutional doctrine). Commentary supporting the decision
includes Arthur Kinoy, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.: An Historic Step Forward, 22 VAND.
L. REV. 475, 476 (1969) (suggesting that "it is impossible to overstate the potentially profound
importance" of Jones decision); Robert L. Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come
Round atLast: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 55 VA. L. REV. 272, 300 (1969) (concluding that
Court's decision was clearly correct in view of legislative history); Note, Jones v. Mayer: The
Thirteenth Amendment and the FederalAnti-Discrimination Laws, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1019,
1056 (1969) (lauding Jones as necessary first step).
11. Jones, 392 U.S. at 449 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
12. WilliamN. Eskridge,Jr.,Renegingon History?: Playing the Court/Congress/President
CivilRights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613,622 (1991).
13. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
14. See City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 129 (1981) (concluding that street
closing was "routine burden of citizenship" and did not violate Thirteenth Amendment).
15. Because the Jones decision came two months after the Fair Housing Act of 1968,
critics mistakenly argued that the decision had neither constitutional nor policy significance.
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In this Article, however, I depart from the doctrinal analysis of the
Warren Court's jurisprudence and direct the inquiry along interdisciplinary
lines that I hope will provide insights regarding the institutional performance
and legitimacy of the Supreme Court in reckoning with race/ism. 6 I attempt
to demonstrate how, in a racist culture, it is very hard to litigate, negotiate, and
maintain antiracist legal remedies, let alone employ them to shift culture." In
other words, law reform is necessary, but not sufficient."8 I incorporate
insights drawn from the field of cultural studies to provide a scene-setting
function to broaden the context of legal analysis and enlarge our sense of hope
and possibility. For a brief moment, the Warren Court did precisely that.' 9
But the Act and § 1982 provided complementary rather than parallel remedies. Eskridge points
out, "The Supreme Court's dynamic interpretation of sections 1982 and 1981 effectively gave
more liberal remedies for racial discrimination in housing and workplace discrimination than
those afforded by [Title VIII and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964], respectively."
Eskridge, supra note 12, at 622; see also Michael W. Combs, The Supreme Court and African
Americans: Personnel and Policy Transformations, 36 How. L.J. 139, 158 (1993) ("As
interpreted in Jones, the 1866 statute provided a much broader base of civil rights protection
than that provided by the more recently enacted 1968 law.").
Today, the 1968 Act, as amended in 1988, is the principal claim lodged against housing
discrimination. Until the 1988 amendments, however, the Act was pretty toothless. Shortly
after the amendments, James Kushner wrote, "The inability to abate widespread discriminatory
practices within the real estate industry is attributable to the weak enforcement tools and efforts
of the past, as well as to the national preferences for segregated lifestyles." James Kushner, The
Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Generation of Fair Housing, 42 VAND.
L. REV. 1049, 1050 (1989).
16. I refer to "race/ism" to underscore the need to connect race and racism, contrary to the
current trend of discussing "race" as a vague force or matter that is separate from human agency
and accountability. See Joe R. Feagin, White Racism: The Foundation of Racial Tensions and
Conflict, 1 UMOJA L.J. 1, 1-2 (1996) (discussing role of racism "in perpetuating the black-
white division").
17. DAVID THmO GOLDBERG, RACIST CULTURE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE POLrTICS OF
MEANING, at viii (1993) (noting that contemporary views of racism primarily are limited to
seeing it as "something that belongs in the past").
18. See LUCAS A. PowE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICANPoUTics 301 (2000)
("As hard as it was for litigators to understand, the problems facing America at the end of the
1960s could not be solved by more law, however quick and satisfying it might be to think so.").
19. See Robert L. Carter, The Warren Court andDesegregation, in THE WARREN COURT:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 46, 56 (Richard H. Saylor et al. eds., 1968) (discussing postmortems of
Brown). Carter, one of the primary NAACP attorneys in the litigation campaign that resulted
in Brown, recognized the mixed legacy of the case: "[T]he psychological dimensions of
America's race relations problem were completely recast ... [and] Brown's indirect conse-
quences.., have been awesome." Id. He notes, however, that "Brown has promised more than
it could give, and therefore has contributed to black alienation and bitterness, to a loss of
confidence in white institutions, and to the growing racial polarization of our society." Id.
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Writing from the perspective of a gay activist and legal scholar, the late
Tom Stoddard wrote an engaging essay that seeks to provide a better under-
standing of the interrelationship between law and culture and, from that, how
the law can be used to promote social justice.2 ° Stoddard describes two
aspects of lawmaking: "rule-shifting" and "culture-shifting. "21 Together these
represent the five general goals of lawmaking: "(1) To create new rights and
remedies for victims; (2) [t]o alter the conduct of the government; (3) [t]o
alter the conduct of citizens and private entities; (4) [t]o express a new moral
ideal or standard; and (5) [t]o change cultural attitudes and patterns." 22 The
first three goals make up the traditional function of lawmaking - altering and
enforcing rules - whereas the last two goals make up the culture-shifting
aspect of law.
I think that the real value of the Warren Court's race jurisprudence lies
in its force as a culture-shifting tool and, more importantly, in its inspiration
to advocates of social justice.23 In Stoddard's view, cases such as Brown v.
Board of Education,24 Baker v. Carr.,25 and Roe v. Wade,26 and the gains he
associates with the civil rights movement and its "companion movements for
political change," inspired many lawyers of his generation." Based on this
inspiration, these lawyers have increasingly used the law to accomplish their
culture-shifting goals. In elaborating on the concept of law's culture-shifting
capacity, Stoddard explains:
20. See Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make
Social Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 970 (1997) (discussing possibilities of using law to
force social change).
21. Id. at 973.
22. Id. at 972.
23. See J. Skelly Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme
Court, 84 HARV. L. REv. 769, 804 (1971) (stating that "one of the greatest legacies of the
Warren Court has been its revolutionary influence on the thinking of law students"). Oraduating
from law school shortly after this publication, I was one of the law students to whom Judge
Wright referred. In his view, the law students of the day "were inspired by the dignity and
moral courage of a man and an institution that was prepared to act on the ideals to which
America is theoretically and rhetorically dedicated." Id. Although Judge Wright's description
of the Warren Court seems almost quaint today, I think it accurately describes the time.
24. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954) (declaring "separate but equal"
school segregation unconstitutional).
25. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1968) (stating that citizen's right to vote may
not be arbitrarily impaired by state action).
26. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (declaring unconstitutional state statute
that imposed criminal sanctions on women who received abortions).
27. Stoddard, supra note 20, at 973.
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We have, in the last half of this century, adapted the law's traditional
mechanisms of change to a newfangled end: making social change that
transcends mere rulemaking and seeks, above and beyond all the rules, to
improve society in fundamental, extralegal ways. In particular, we have
sought to advance the rights and interests of people who have been treated
badly by the law and by the culture, either individually or collectively, and
to promote values we think ought to be rights.28
According to Stoddard, four factors are essential for nilemaking to pro-
duce a cultural-shift: a broad and profound change in the law, public aware-
ness of the change and its significance, a general sense that the change is
legitimate or valid, and continuous enforcement of the change. 29 All four of
these must exist; anything less reduces the result to mere rule-shifting.30
According to Nan Hunter, a fifth necessary factor for culture-shift is public
engagement.3 The culture-shifting framework, as an extension of legal advo-
cacy - in the courts, in the legislature, and in society - provides an introductory
backdrop for the current Article.
Legal scholars tend to assess the Warren Court's legacy without giving
sufficient consideration to the culture-shifting aspects. However, contestation
over these aspects, is where the action is. Promoting values that ought to be
rights was the hallmark ofthe Warren Court's jurisprudence.32 Because values
were so central to the advancement of lawmaking as culture-shifting, the
reaction to the Court was driven not only by material interests, but also by
differences over values that define "simple justice" in America.33 Today, this
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 978.
30. Id.
31. Nan Hunter, Lawyeringfor Social Justice, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1009, 1019 (1997).
Hunter argues that public engagement is more than consciousness, passive support, or even
legitimacy: "Unless there is significant public engagement in some form, beyond a small cadre
of litigators or lobbyists, in the effort to change the law, there is no basis for culture-shifting."
Id. Thus, Hunter rebuts Stoddard's argument that legislation, such as the Civil Rights Act of
1964, offers the best chance of culture-shifting.
32. But see Sumi Cho, Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment Earl Warren,
Brown, and a Theory of Racial Redemption, 40 B.C. L. REV. 73, 75 (1998) (noting that as
California's Attorney General and gubernatorial candidate in 1942, Warren was "a key actor in
the anti-Asian movement that culminated in the 1942 internment of over 120,000 persons of
Japanese ancestry"). I will not trivialize Warren's actions as a mere regulation of unwanted
traffic.
33. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROW V v BOARD OF
EDUCATioN, TE EPOCHAL SUPREME COURT DECISION THATOunrAWED SEGREGATION, AND OF
BLACK AMERICA'S CENTiRY-LONG STRUGGLE FOR EQUAlITY UNDER LAW 710-14 (Vintage
Books 1977) (1975) (cataloging wildly disparate reactions to Brown).
l0
THE LA WAND CULTURE-SHIFT 1101
cultural terrain remains a ground of contestation between the Right and the
Left.34
At this point I must refer, briefly, to the reality that we live in a racist
culture. It is important, however, to acknowledge that in referring generally to
white people, I realize the risks of this overinclusive categorization. Even as
I impugn the integrity of America for its racist ways, I am trying to write
carefully to avoid coming across as anti-white, lest I reduce all white individu-
als to fungible parts of a collective personification of evil, injustice, and
oppression.
Undeniably, however, a stubborn racial divide marks the complex legacy
of the Warren Court's civil rights jurisprudence. According to a recent New
York Times poll, over forty-five years after Brown v. Board ofEducation struck
down legally sanctioned segregation, "a majority of Americans maintain that
race relations in the United States are generally good, but blacks and whites
continue to have starkly divergent perceptions of many racial issues and they
remain largely isolated from each other in their everyday lives."35 As the poll
suggests, "even as the rawest forms of bigotry have receded they have often
been replaced by remoteness and distrust in places of work, learning and
worship." '36 Moreover, in writing an introduction to the New York Times poll
compilation, Joseph Lelyveld notes a profound detachment from race among
whites:
That blacks are oversensitive, that race is something that needs to be purged
from their consciousness, that the problem of race is now mainly in their
heads, is a leitmotif of white conversation captured in these articles - the
first response of whites who, knowing themselves to be well meaning and
guiltless by definition, find no connection between the persistence of race
as a fundamental category in American life and their own individual lives.
In simplest terms, race and issues of race make no obvious demand on
them."
34. For example, one of today's prominent conservatives, Ralph Reed, declares, "We are
not revolutionaries, but counterrevolutionaries, seeking to resist the left's agenda and to keep
them from imposing their values on our homes, churches, and families." DAVID BROCK,
BIJNDEDBYTHERIGHT: THE CONSCIENCE OFANEx-CoNsERVATrVE 122(2002); seealsoDavid
H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States'Rights, Color-Blind
Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267,315-20 (2001) (claiming that "conserva-
tive" Rehnquist Court disfavors claims of racial minorities).
35. Kevin Sack with Janet Elder, The New York Times Poll on Race: Optimistic Outlook
But Enduring Racial Division, in How RACE Is LIVED IN AMERICA: PuLLING TOGETHER,
PULING APART 365, 365 (2001).
36. Id.
37. Joseph Lelyveld, Introduction, in How RACE Is LIVED IN AMERICA: PULLINo To-
GETHER, PULL NG APART, at ix, xv (2001).
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As long as race makes no obvious demands on whites in these terms, ironi-
cally, their everyday racism will continue to manifest itself in interpersonal
relations, institutional arrangements, and cultural expression. Certainly, we
have no chance to effectuate a real cultural-shift through lawmaking. Nor is
there an advancement of an anti-racist moral ideal or standard. Perhaps most
disconcerting, a stasis in current cultural attitudes and patterns exists that
hampers progress towards the goal of overarching justice for all peoples."
When I hear about scandals in the corporate world or within the priest-
hood, I ask: What about the scandal of racism?39 Where is the bipartisan
indignation?4" Where is the shame?4' Is it true, as Albert Memmi says of
racism, that "[w]here everyone tolerates and condones scandal, scandal
disappears"?42 Consider the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election, for
example. In Florida, a statewide poll of African American opinion on the
matter was conducted. One reader wrote the following letter to the editor of
the St. Petersburg Times, and whether his candid view is more typical than not
defines the culture-shifting issue:
Why is it that each day when I open your paper it seems I'm confronted
with some problem the blacks are having and, as usual, the cause of their
problem is white racism? Do you really believe that promoting this idea
with your constant preaching will accomplish some worthwhile goal?
You are accomplishing two things at least. One: You're instilling in
blacks the notion all their troubles stem from something whites have done
to them. They're learning to enjoy their victimhood and they become
paranoid, looking everywhere for evidence of racism to blame for their
own inability to compete in an industrialized, technology-heavy society.
Two: You're boring the hell out of whites who are tending to tune out the
38. Some argue that my narrative of progress understates the racial improvement that
marks the nation's cultural-shift on matters of race and racism. The most influential work
holding this view is STEPHAN THFJNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND
WHITE: ONE NATIONINDIISIBLE (1997). They claim that "[i]n the years before the civil ights
revolution, hard-core white racism was ubiquitous; in the 1990s, it is largely a thing of the past."
Id. at 499.
39. Here, I use scandal to mean a "circumstance or action that offends propriety or
established moral conceptions or disgraces those associated with or involved in it." WEBSTER'S
THID NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2024 (unabridged ed.
1993).
40. Adam Nagourney, CorporateAbuses Cause Bipartisan Indignation, N.Y. TIMES, July
29, 2002, at A16.
41. Frank Bruni, Pope Tells Crowd of "Shame" Caused by Abusive Prests, N.Y. TIMES,
July 29, 2002, at Al.
42. ALBERT MEMMI, RACISM 179 (Steve Martinot trans., rev. ed. 2000) (1968).
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constant whining. The result is you're compounding the racial problem
rather than helping to solve it. 3
Against this perplexing backdrop, I situate this Article within the evolv-
ing field of "critical race studies."' I consider the current post-civil rights era
to examine how much of the Warren Court's liberal legacy remains, more in
culture than in law, and how sufficient were its premises of equality and
freedom, again, more in culture than in law. Part II discusses certain aspects
of cultural studies as an interdisciplinary approach that helps us make sense
of that jurisprudential legacy as culture-shifting law. Part III examines the
importance of the cultural representation of race, within the context of City of
Memphis v. Greene,45 largely reviewing the contrasting racial narratives of
Justice John Paul Stevens, who wrote for the majority, and Justice Thurgood
Marshall, who wrote a dissenting opinion. Through a series of four vignettes,
Part IV considers how the cultural representation of people of color as un-
wanted traffic extends beyond jurisprudence. Finally, Part V takes up a
prescriptive call for well-intentioned whites to engage in the serious work of
advancing a cultural shift that facilitates their movement from racial ambiva-
lence to racial comity and a sincere embrace of our common humanity.
43. Bob Luckman, Letter to the Editor, Compounding the Racial Problem, ST. PETERS-
BURG TIzms, Feb. 24, 2001, at 17A. One reader complained that an article, which reported
African Americans' opinions of the 2000 presidential election, was "outrageous... perpetuating
hate and unrest... like a scab that's healing and your newspaper is scraping and scratching at
it to keep it from healing." Dorothy E. Karkheck, Letter to the Editor, Picking at a Sore Spot,
ST. PETERSBURo TIMES, Feb. 24, 2001, at 17A. Another reader wrote that a similar article was
"one of the most inflammatory and irresponsible pieces... ever done." J.L. Rasmussen, Letter
to the Editor, Fanning the Flames of Racism, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Feb. 24, 2001, at 17A.
This letter writer further advised, "Instead of sticking with these phonies [Jesse Jackson and
Rep. Alcee Hastings], blacks ought to turn instead to men like Rep. J.C. Watts, Justice Clarence
Thomas and commentators like Dr. Walter Williams and Thomas Sowell. These are literate,
logical black men of integrity, who encourage self-sufficiency and do not just spew a party line.
The Times should be ashamed for trying to fan the flames of racism through this horrible
journalism." Id.
44. As Cheryl Harris explains:
From this vantage point, the issue is not simply how societal bias is reflected in the
legal system or how the law manages disputes that implicate race: The objective
is to map the mutually constitutive relationship between race and the law. The law
produces, constructs, and constitutes race, not only in domains where race is
explicitly articulated, but also where race is unspoken or unacknowledged.
Cheryl I. Harris, Critical Race Studies: An Introduction, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1215, 1216-17
(2002). The UCLA Law School has developed the Critical Race Studies concentration as a field
of study - "the first of its kind anywhere." Id. at 1216. This issue of the UCLA Law Review
contains a number of insightful pieces from a rich diversity of authors. See generally Critical
Race Studies, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1215-1610 (2002).
45. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
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II. Race Law: The View from Culture
Exploring the meaning of "culture" and relying on "cultural studies" is
a perilous adventure. As Naomi Mezey remarks, "The notion of culture is
everywhere invoked and virtually nowhere explained."46 Worse, regarding
"cultural studies," she warns that although it is "the engine" of her investiga-
tion, "cultural studies suffers from the same definitional distress as culture
itself: No one is exactly sure what it means to others and everyone is loath to
offer their own working definitions. ""' In this Article, I use culture primarily
to refer not only to signifying or symbolic systems and the social meanings that
these generate, but also to a certain kind of an oppositional practice that
challenges a dominant hegemony that is subordinating. Although I travel with
unfamiliar maps, this Article is something of a move both within and beyond
a "cultural turn" in the social sciences and history.4" I focus on the controversy
over how African Americans and other nonwhites are represented in society
through cultural constructions. 9 Cultural studies facilitates a focus on power,
50
46. Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35,35 (2001).
47. ld. at 36.
48. As Victoria Bonnell and Lynn Hunt explain, cultural studies is associated with a
realignment of disciplines and the accompanying collapse of explanatory paradigms such as case
law. Thus, they claim, "The most important characteristic of cultural studies is that it depends
on a range of explanatory paradigms and deals fundamentally with issues of domination, that
is, contestations of power .... In cultural studies, causal explanation takes a back seat.., to
the demystification and deconstruction of power." Victoria E. Bonnell & Lynn Hunt, Introduc-
tion, in BEYOND THE CULTURAL TURN: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF SOCIETY AND
CULTURE 1, 10-11 (Victoria E. Bonnell & Lynn Hunt eds., 1999).
49. This continues my work begun in John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie
Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65
S. CAL. L. REV. 2129, 2182-91, 2219-28 (1992) (discussing, respectively, tie between cultural
orientation and liberating practice, and need to attack cultural racism). This was one of the
earliest works of legal scholarship that relied on the theories of Michael Omi and Howard
Winant. Id. at 2160 n.105. See generally MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980S (1986) (assessing contemporary
racial theory and asserting that significance of race has been reduced in public debate by
conservatives' hiding of racial issues under rhetoric of economics and individualism); MICHAEL
OMI&HowARDWINANT, RACIALFORMATIONINTHE UNITED STATES: FROMTHE 1960sTOTHE
1990s (2d ed. 1994) (updating first edition and providing more detailed description of racial
formation theory); see also John 0. Calmore, Exploring Michael Omi's "Messy" Real World
of Race: An Essay for "Naked People Longing to Swim Free," 15 LAW & INEQ. 25, 37-41
(1997) (discussing various "racial projects" that connect culture (discourse) and structure
(political agendas)).
50. Tony Bennett discusses the elasticity of the term "cultural studies":
It now functions largely as a term of convenience for a fairly dispersed array of
theoretical and political positions which, however widely divergent they might be
in other respects, share a commitment to examining cultural practices from the point
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which is important to my analysis because an imbalance in power between
whites and blacks is at the root of racismf51
An important theme in this Article is the need to understand the vaned and
complex experiences of racial subordination. 2 The discipline of cultural
studies enhances that understanding. One aspect of the experience of racial
subordination is the social and cultural construction of people - of human
beings - as "unwanted traffic." Because black images are constructed largely
without benefit of sustained interpersonal contact between blacks and whites,53
the "reality of race" and its significance, at least within the black-white para-
digm, may now be more culturally constructed than socially constructed,
although both constructions continue to operate in tandem. As one black male
journalist has stated, "'To almost all cops and most of society, I am a criminal
of view of their intrication with, and within, relations of power.
Tony Bennett, Putting Policy into Cultural Studies, in CULTURAL STUDIES 23, 23 (Lawrence
Orossberg et al. eds., 1992). A dominant white universe of norms, masked as cultural neutrality,
imbues everyday practices of white people with power. See Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Race, Reform,
and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1331, 1379 (1988) (referring to the "white norm... as a statement of the positive social
norm, legitimating the continuing domination of those who do not meet it").
51. For an insightful consideration of this point, see Chdla Sandoval, Theorizing White
Consciousness for a Post-Empire World: Barthes, Fanon, and the Rhetoric of Love, in
DISPLACING WHITENEss: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CRITICISM 86, 101 (Ruth
Frankenberg ed., 1997) (quoting author Franz Fanon as saying that blacks are "exploited,
enslaved, despised by a colonialist, capitalist society that is only accidentally white"); see also
Peniel E. Joseph, Black Liberation Without Apology: Reconceptualizing the Black Power
Movement, BLACK SCHOLAR, Fall-Winter 2001, at 2, 14-15 (analyzing history and struggles of
Black Power movement and concluding that movement was strongest at time when white racism
was most fierce and overt); Gary Pellet, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 790 ("The
mainstream reactions to black nationalism were so vociferous not because the Black Power
movement presented any real threat of racial domination by blacks, but rather because [it]
embodied a profound rejection of the reigning ideology for understanding the distribution of
power and privilege in American society.").
52. See generally Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American
Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1258 (1992) (listing historical examples of racism towards various people of color).
53. See, e.g., PAULA. JARGOWSKY, PovERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS, AND THE
AMERICAN CITY 139-44 (1997) (analyzing racial and economic makeup of neighborhoods);
DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 84-93 (1993) (describing spatial isolation of blacks from whites
and reluctance of members of both races to integrate neighborhoods); JOHN YINGER, CLOSED
DOORS, OPPORTUNITIES LOST: THE CONTINUING COSTS OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 51-61,
136 (1995) (describing phenomenon of racial steering, noting that whites are minority in public
schools in many areas, and quoting a white student as claiming that "[w]e don't start out as
racist. We are all racist now.").
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who happens not to have committed his first crime."'5 4 As this predicament
suggests, today a significant cultural legacy of Brown v. Board of Education's
failure is what Leonard Steinhom and Barbara Diggs-Brown call "rhetorical
integration" in which "[slymbolism becomes truth [and] image becomes
reality."55
The characterization of African Americans and other people of color as
unwanted traffic is one of today's most powerful metaphors of exclusion and
aversion. As a racist euphemism, more than a metaphor, its power lies in its
eliding race from the equation of oppression. Once nonwhites are racialized s
as unwanted traffic, they are subjected to the structuring of hierarchical
systems of group inequality that impede, or even deny completely, their access
to material betterment, group power, and social status. The particularly
insidious power of racialization, therefore, is its pretextual displacement of
race so that claims of racial discrimination appear to be beside the point.
White America's denial of "race/ism"' is the nation's acute (color)blind spot.
Fundamental to the analysis of subordinated people as so-called unwanted
traffic is David Chaney's observation that "[riepresentation, far from being
pictures of the social world, is more profoundly understood as the endlessly
negotiable ways in which that world is being constituted and articulated." s
From this point of view, then, culture not only provides meaning to our
experience, it also provides the very terms of experience. 9 Unfortunately, the
mass media drive various aspects of the negative imagery and "terms of
experience."6 For a significant number of African Americans, Asians, and
54. LEONARD STEINHORN& BARBARA DIGOS-BROWN, BY THE COLOROFOURSKN: THE
ILLUSION OF INTEGRATION AND THE REALITY OF RACE 40 (1999).
55. Id. at 199-200.
56. I use the word "racialization" to mean the dialectical process of signification whereby
race-netural references take on racial significance. ROBERT MILES, RACISM 73-76 (1989).
57. See supra note 16 (explaining use of term "race/ism").
58. DAVID CHANEY, THE CuLTuRALTURN: SCENE-SETTING ESSAYS oNCONTEMPORARY
HISTORY 71-72 (1994).
59. See CHARLES P. HENRY, CULTURE AND AFRICAN AMERICAN POLTICS 8-11 (1990)
(discussing culture of black language and how media representations, along with poorly-
developed ideological structures, reflect on black experience).
60. According to Jannette Dates and William Barlow:
Racial representations help to mold public opinion, then hold it in place and set the
agenda for public discourse on the race issue in the media and in the society at
large. Black media stereotypes are not the natural, much less harmless, products
of an idealized popular culture; rather, they are more commonly socially con-
structed images that are selective, partial, one-dimensional, and distorted in their
portrayal of African Americans. Moreover, stereotyped black images most often
are frozen, incapable of growth, change, innovation, or transformation.
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Latina/os, one telling term of experience is their representation as "unwanted
traffic."
Hence, I am trying to track how culture operates within the context of
"race making. "61 According to Stuart Hall, the British scholar who has greatly
influenced the development of cultural studies, the word culture refers to "'the
actual grounded terrain of practices, representations, languages and customs
of any specific society... [and] the contradictory forms of common sense
which have taken root in and helped to shape popular life."' 62 Thus, the
culture is concerned with issues that revolve around shared - perhaps hege-
monic - social meanings that constitute the variety of ways in which we make
sense of the world.63 As such, culture is an arena of contestation, subject to
negotiation. In this regard, Mezey views culture as "any set of shared, signify-
ing practices - practices by which meaning is produced, performed, contested,
or transformed."' Mezey observes that "law and culture are mutually consti-
tuted, and legal and cultural meanings are produced precisely at the intersec-
tion of the two domains."65 She observes that "the negotiation of legal mean-
ing is always a cultural act."66 This is precisely the point of my analysis of
City of Memphis v. Greene in Part III of the Article. The exercise in that
Jannette L. Dates & William Barlow, Introduction: A War oflmages, in SPLIT IMAGE: AFRICAN
AMRIcANs IN THE MASS MEDIA 1, 5 (Jannette L. Dates & William Barlow eds., 2d ed. 1993).
61. "Race making" is a term coined by Edgar Thompson and is used to explain how racial
segregation and classification result in racial identities, attitudes, and prejudices. David R.
James, The Racial Ghetto as a Race-Making Situation: The Effects of Residential Segregation
on RacialInequalities and Racial Identity, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 407, 413 n.19, 422 (1994)
(citing EDGART. THOMPSON, PLANTATION SOCmTS, RACE RELATIONS ANDTHE SoUTH 115-17
(1975)).
Here I mean to draw attention to Anthony Marx's important work and his particular
observation that, "to the extent that those dominated retain their own agency, their actions must
be explained in terms of structural and cultural forces." ANTHONY W. MARX, MAKING RACE
AND NATION: A COMPAISON OF SOUTHAFRICA, THE UNrD STATES, AND BRAZIL 18 (1998).
Progressive race scholars have criticized the failure of the individualist paradigm of discrimina-
tion to focus more effectively on structural racism. Increasingly, as well, these scholars,
particularly Asians and Latina/os, are drawing attention to "cultural forces" as well. While this
Article focuses on the latter, I am well aware of the importance of the former. See John 0.
Calmore, Raceism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1067, 1074 (1998) (noting that general perception that racism is disappearing is actually
empowering racist forms and expressions).
62. CHRIS BARKER, CULTURAL STUDIES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 8 (2000).
63. Id.
64. Mezey, supra note 46, at 42.
65. Id. at 57.
66. See id. at 47 (asserting that negotiation of legal meaning is always cultural, but law
and culture are distinguishable in terms of how power is assigned).
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section of the Article expresses a severe criticism of racial representations that
"distort, ignore, or displace important aspects of the lives of subordinate
groups."
67
As intimated earlier, it is impossible to mark clearly the boundaries of
cultural studies; there are no precedents or statutes. The genre of cultural
studies means different things to different people, but we can initially adopt
the following definition:
[Olne may begin by saying that cultural studies is an interdisciplinary,
transdisciplinary, and sometimes counter-disciplinary field that operates in
the tension between tendencies to embrace both a broad, anthropological
and a more narrowly humanistic conception of culture. Unlike traditional
anthropology, however, it has grown out of analyses of modem industrial
societies. It is typically interpretative and evaluative in its methodologies,
but unlike traditional humanism it rejects the exclusive equation of culture'
with high culture and argues that all forms of cultural production need to
be studied in relation to other cultural practices and to social and historical
structures. Cultural studies is thus committed to the study of the entire
range of society's arts, beliefs, institutions, and communicative practices. 6'
For those who think like lawyers, engaging in cultural studies is daunting
because it represents such an eclectic tool kit of theory and practice. The
discipline of cultural studies has developed, with all its complexities and self-
contradictions, against the backdrop of major shifts in the social world that
have changed many people's lives. I think the Warren Court "revolution"
67. OscARH. GANDY, JR., COMMUNICATION AND RACE: ASTRUCTURALPERSPECTIVE 11
(1998).
68. Cary Nelson et al., Cultural Studies: An Introduction, in CULTURAL STUDIES 1, 4
(Lawrence Grossberg et al. eds., 1992). Other elements of a definition of cultural studies that
I adopt include the following:
1. Cultural studies is an interdisciplinary field in which perspectives from differ-
ent disciplines can be selectively drawn on to examine the relations of culture
and power.
2. Cultural studies is concerned with all those practices, institutions, and systems
of classification through which there are inculcated in a population particular
values, beliefs, competencies, routines of life and habitual forms of conduct.
3. The forms of power that cultural studies explores are diverse and include
gender, race, class, colonialism, etc. Cultural studies seeks to explore the
connections between these forms of power and to develop ways of thinking
about culture and power that can be utilized by agents in the pursuit of change.
4. The prime institutional sites for cultural studies are those of higher education,
and as such cultural studies is like other academic disciplines. Nevertheless,
it tries to forge connections outside of the academy with social and political
movements, workers in cultural institutions, and cultural management.
BARKER, supra note 62, at 7.
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regarding race relations, if not race law, constitutes one of those shifts. As
Elizabeth Long observes, "These same social changes refracted through the
academy have made many scholars - perhaps especially those somewhat on
the edges of traditional academic communities, disciplines, or careers - feel
quite keenly the distance between their own disciplinary traditions and what
seems in need of understanding."'69 I see the turn to cultural studies as both
necessary and proper because social injustice seems to have overwhelmed the
ability of law to redress it. Further, legal scholarship, in the narrow sense,
seems quite inadequate to address what we need to know to open our society,
to promote a multiracial democracy, and to establish a more just order. These
values were the primary culture-shifting ambitions of the Warren Court's race
jurisprudence.
An additional feature of cultural studies that supports my value orienta-
tion is its identification with progressive and Leftist politics. I find a firm
connection here because the theoretical approaches and substantive concerns
of cultural studies are conditioned by that identification."0 In particular,
cultural studies has employed its theoretical aspects to engage in a critical
commentary on social and cultural life. As Craig Calhoun notes in a different
context, cultural studies seeks an "engagement with the social world that starts
from the presumption that existing arrangements... do not exhaust the range
of possibilities."'" Cultural studies "seeks to explore the ways in which our
categories of thought reduce our freedom by occluding recognition of what
could be."72 Thus, cultural studies fits within the critical tradition's impera-
tive to examine the regnant frameworks, categories, and assumptions about
our world.
At the end of the day, cultural studies represents a response to social
change that simply makes more sense to me than the law's response to that
change. The large shifts in society and culture over the nearly fifty years
since Brown v. Board of Education have outpaced the rights and remedies that
are part of the Warren Court's legacy. Cultural studies is a tool to bridge this
gap. Thus, as I am drawing on cultural studies, it reflects a realignment of
disciplines. Particularly, the intersection of law and cultural studies provides
an analytical framework that responds to the collapse of various explanatory
69. Elizabeth Long, Engaging Sociologv and Cultural Studies: Disciplinarity and Social
Change, in FROM SOCIOLOGY TO CULTURAL STUDIES: NEW PERSPECTIVES 17 (1997).
70. See id. at 14 (characterizing cultural studies as identified with theoretical approaches
and substantive concerns of progressive or leftist politics).
71. CRAIG CALHOUN, CRICAL SOCIAL THEORY: CULTURE, HISTORY, AND THE CHAL-
LENGE OF DIFERENcE, at xviii (1995).
72. Id.
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paradigms that we associate with antidiscrimination law's ability to advance
social justice."
Teaching in North Carolina and writing within the pages of this Law
Review, I am acutely aware that civil rights jurisprudence developed initially
and primarily in response to race relations in the South. This history has
continuing significance for both law and culture. Caroline Walker Bynum is
an historian who was born and raised in the South, although she is currently
a professor at Columbia University. For her, southern roots mean more than
just a curiosity about the past; they also mean "a coming to terms with one's
past." 4 She observes, "I think the American South is part of the United States
with the strongest sense of history[,J... the strongest sense of being rooted
in a past, and the strongest sense of a complex relationship with the
past. . . .5"" She adds,
After all, if you have Southern ancestors, you grow up in a defeated coun-
try and you grow up in a country that was defeated for what you think was
the right reason; you come from a region that lost a war, and you should
have lost the war; you were fighting for the wrong thing. You have a very
complicated relationship with the past because you're always thinking,
"What can I preserve, but what do I give up?"'76
What can be preserved and what must be given up are fundamental issues yet
to be resolved for the nation, not merely the South. Moreover, the influence
of the South, both politically and culturally, transcends regional geography."'
The federal laws that prohibit discrimination because of race must be situated
within this context of evolving tensions and questions.
We recognize that the Warren Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board
of Education set the stage - the constitutional authority and ambition - for
laws prohibiting several forms of discrimination, including the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,' the Voting Rights Act of 1965,"9 and the Civil Rights Act of
73. See GEORGE E. MARCUS & MICHAEL M.J. FISCHER, ANTHROPOLOGY AS CULTURAL
CRrIQUE: AN EXPERIMENTALMOMENTINTHE HUMAN SCIENCS 8-9 (1986) (discussing "crisis
of representation" in which traditional paradigms for solving social problems are inadequate and
how debate in several fields is shifting toward alternative interpretations of social reality).
74. Mary Jungeun Lee, A Southern Medievalist, COLUMBIA COU.EoE TODAY, Nov. 2001,
at 9 (quoting from interview with Carolyn Bynum).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See PETER APPLEOME, DIXIE RISING: How THE SorH Is SHAPiNG AMERcAN
VALUES, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 16 (1996) (concluding that southern political and cultural
influence has made understanding "the South" critical to understanding America).
78. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-2000h-3 (1994)) (prohibiting discrimination in employment, public
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1968.80 The description of the Warren Court as "revolutionary" should be
associated, inter alla, with this development. Today, however, as this body
of law is rigorously contested, a number of questions arise. Did the Warren
Court promise too much or not enough? If the Court's promise is less than it
ought to be, then what alternative means are available to aggrieved parties?
What is the nation's antidiscrimination culture? What is the nation's culture
of social justice, equality, and multiracial democracy? What role do the law
and the Supreme Court in particular play in constituting these cultural compo-
nents of the national ethos?
If "revolutionary" aptly describes the Warren Court's antidiscrimination
jurisprudence, its law-making legacy faces premature death. This premature
death results from a politics and culture of race/ism that represent society's
wrong answers to Caroline Bynum's profound question regarding what must
be preserved and what must be let go from our racial history. Although the
reach of the Warren Court's jurisprudence extended to many areas, race and
racism are central to the evaluation of its legacy. In part, it was the times. In
part, it was the recognition made clear by Charles Black that "[r]acism is a
special subject in the United States, whether in or outside the law; it is the
special subject in the United States."'" Dealing with this special subject
would have been revolutionary, but no institution in government or society has
ever adequately done so. Indeed, much of the promise of Brown has now
disappeared. Today's jurisprudence of race/ism represents a retreat from the
Warren Court's egalitarianism, a retreat that is fueled by a reactionary back-
lash. Today's Supreme Court is in the vanguard of constitutional backlash
and retrenchment."2 In terms of race/ism, the features of contemporary
judicial retrenchment include: (1) an imposition of a heavy burden to prove
the elusive intent to discriminate; (2) an adoption of race neutrality, or
colorblindness, as a paramount principle; (3) a rejection of societal discrimi-
nation as a wrong to be redressed; (4) a rejection of race-based group rights,
primarily in the areas of affirmative action and voting rights; (5) a judicial
accommodations, and government assistance).
79. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, Title VIL 79 Stat. 437 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974 (1994)) (prohibiting discrimination in voting).
80. See Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994)) (prohibiting discrimination in housing).
81. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WAsH. L.
REV. 3,25 (1970).
82. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolu-
tion, 87 VA. L. REv. 1045, 1092-93 (2001) (arguing that judicial activism of Warren Court has
been replaced by harsher, more conservative activism of today's Court).
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affirmation of white "self-congratulation" and "self-absolution" regarding the
nation's racist history and present; and (6) a judicial alignment with the
political Right-wing's merger of conservative themes and racist ideology.
These features represent the current Court majority's attempt to exorcise the
ghosts ofthe Warren Court. Hence, Jeffrey Rosen argues that the Court's race
decisions during the 1995 term, for example, "reveal the conservative judicial
project to be unprincipled at its core." 3
II. City of Memphis v. Greene: The Legal Construction
of "Unwanted Traffic"
Stepping back from the present unfortunate jurisprudential moment, I
turn now to an examination of the Court's decision in City of Memphis v.
Greene, viewing it through the lens of cultural studies. This case is illustra-
tive, not exhaustive. A significant number of race cases could be subjected
to a more rigorous analysis by looking beyond doctrine to the law's intersec-
tion with culture.
84
83. Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, NEW REPUBLIC, July 31, 1995, at 19 (com-
menting that conservative Justices apply judicial restraint and strict constructionism only when
politically convenient).
84. See Paulette M. Caldwell,A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection ofRace and
Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 366 (describing racially discriminatory effect of Rogers v.
American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), which upheld right of employers to
prohibit braided hairstyles in workplace); Sumi K. Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized
Sexual Harassment Where theModel MinorityMeets Suzie Wong, I J. GENDER, RACE & JUST.
177, 178 (1997) (exploring sexual harassment case of university professor who sought out
Japanese women because he believed them to be sexually submissive); Laura E. Gomez, Race
Mattered: Racial Formation and the Politics of Crime in Territorial New Mexico, 49 UCLA
L. REV. 1395, 1415-16 (2002) (describing application of "racial formation" theory to specific
legal context of nineteenth century territorial New Mexico); Neil Gotanda, Comparative
Racialization: Racial Profiling and the Case of Wen Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1689, 1690
(2000) (arguing that popular treatment of Wen Ho Lee as suspected spy was indicative of racial
bias against Asian Americans); Kevin R. Johnson, The End of "Civil Rights" as We Know It?:
Immigration and Civil Rights in the New Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1481, 1482 (2002)
(discussing rise of new civil rights issues resulting from growing foreign-born population in
United States); Mar J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1330 (1991) (addressing
application of antidiscrimination laws to bias against people with certain types of accents);
Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND L. REV. 297, 298-99 (1990)
(criticizing anti-affirmative action rhetoric for its focus on "innocent white victims" rather than
on broader goals of racial progress); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 1575, 1575-76 (2002) (analyzing roots of hate violence incidents against persons who
appear "Middle Eastern, Arab or Muslim" after September 11, 2001); Eric Yamamoto, Practi-
cally Refraining Rights: Culture, Translation, and Judging, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875, 875
(2000) (discussing cultural frameworks that color how decisionmakers understand hard
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In City of Memphis v Greene, the Supreme Court of the United States
legitimized the adverse representation of blacks as "undesirable traffic." 5 The
Court upheld the city's decision to close West Drive at the boundary point
between black and white neighborhoods. 86 The Court held that the black
plaintiffs did not suffer an injury to their property interests under the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982,7 and that the closure
did not violate the Thirteenth Amendment.8" Residents of the black neighbor-
hood had claimed that the city violated both the Thirteenth Amendment and
§ 1982 because the street closing created racially separate neighborhoods,
constituted a "badge of slavery," and diminished the property value of homes
in the black neighborhood for the benefit of those in the white neighborhood."
The dispute in City of Memphis v. Greene was largely about factual
inferences and symbolic messages. The case involved a street barrier that the
city ostensibly built to prevent the flow of traffic, but that just happened to fall
on the dividing line between black and white neighborhoods.'c The use of
street closings and dividing walls are part of our country's history of racial
discrimination.9' In this case, the economically privileged, exclusively white
neighborhood of Hein Park lobbied the Memphis city government to close
West Drive.9 Most of the traffic consisted of residents of a predominantly
underprivileged black neighborhood who used West Drive as a primary
evidence and social context in legal cases).
85. See City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 115-16 (1981) (viewing unwanted
traffic flow as factor supporting decision to close street).
86. See id. at 128-29 (concluding that impact of West Drive's closing is routine burden
of citizenship regardless of residents' race).
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994) ("All citizens of the United States shall have the same
right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.").
88. See Greene, 451 U.S. at 124, 128-29 (concluding that injury to black citizens did not
impair their property interests or civil rights).
89. See id. at 105-10 (describing litigation issues, including street closure's alleged
disparate racial effect with respect to privacy and property rights and claims that closing was
"badge of slavery" under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 and violative of Thirteenth Amendment).
90. See id. at 103 (characterizing Hein Park as predominantly white and neighborhood
north of Hein Park as predominantly black).
91. See Comment, City of Memphis v. Greene: A Giant Step Backwards in the Area of
Civil Rights Enforcement, 48 BROOK. L. REv. 621,643 (1982) (comparing Memphis's decision
to close West Drive with "ghettoization of blacks" and creation of "racial enclave").
92. See Greene, 451 U.S. at 103 (stating that residents of Hein Park asked city to close
four streets leading to their neighborhood).
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thoroughfare to a public park. 3 The Greene decision drew substantial criti-
cism as an endorsement of subtle racism.94
Writing for the Court majority, Justice Stevens reversed the decision of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which had invali-
dated the city's decision to close West Drive.95 According to the appellate
court, the city's decision was invalid because:
(1) the closing would benefit a white neighborhood and adversely affect
blacks; (2) a barrier that was to be erected precisely at the point of separa-
tion of these neighborhoods would undoubtedly have the effect of limiting
contact between them; (3) the closing was not part of a citywide plan but
rather was a unique step to protect one neighborhood from outside influ-
ences which the white residents considered to be undesirable; and (4) there
was evidence of an economic depreciation in the property values in the
predominantly black area.96
In overruling the Sixth Circuit, Justice Stevens explained that the factual
record simply did not support these conclusions.97 Given the long history of
discrimination and residential segregation in Memphis and the association of
the street closing with past badges and incidents of slavery, Justice Stevens's
understanding of what was happening in Memphis was quite different from
that of the appellate court. He devoted over half of his opinion to examining
meticulously the facts of the case and the proper inferences to be drawn from
the circumstances. He concluded:
[T~he critical facts established by the record are these: the city's decision
to close West Drive was motivated by its interest in protecting the safety
and tranquility of a residential neighborhood. The procedures followed in
making the decision were fair and were not affected by any racial or other
impermissible factors. The city has conferred a benefit on certain white
property owners but there is no reason to believe that it would refuse to
confer a comparable benefit on black property owners. The closing has not
93. See id. (noting that significant amount of traffic continued to Overton Park).
94. See, e.g., Note, Constitutional Law - Civil Rights - Memphis Street Closing:
Minimal Inconvenience or Monument to Racial Hostility?, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 931, 941
(1982) (arguing that Memphis's history of racial discrimination raises doubts about Court's
reasoning); Comment, Dead-End Street: Discrimination, the Thirteenth Amendment, and
Section 1982 - Memphis v. Greene, 58 CIR.-KENT L. REV. 873, 903-04 (1982) (arguing that
decision allowed "subtle instances of discrimination caused by facially neutral procedures" to
"pass judicial muster").
95. See Greene, 451 U.S. at 102 (concluding that factual record did not support court of
appeals holding).
96. Id. at 109 (quoting Greene v. City of Memphis, 610 F.2d 395,404 (1979)).
97. Id. at 102.
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affected the value of property owned by black citizens, but it has caused
some slight inconvenience to black motorists."
In many ways, the opinion of Justice Stevens simply endorsed Judge
Celebrezze's dissent in the Sixth Circuit. In Judge Celebrezze's view, the
dispute was not a matter implicating racial justice or the equal protection of
the laws, but was primarily a straightforward question of whether a city had
properly exercised its police powers to close a street." According to Judge
Celebrezze, the closure did not violate § 1982 because it did not "deprive black
citizens of their right to hold property free from racial discrimination."100
Moreover, the closure did not violate equal protection principles because the
decision did not involve any intent to discriminate against the black resident
plaintiffs."' Judge Celebrezze indicated that "[wihile distinctions based on
race are inherently suspect, distinctions between residents and non-residents
of a local neighborhood are not invidious."102
In reformulating the factual questions, Justice Marshall's dissent in City
of Memphis v. Greene provided the context that Justice Stevens had over-
looked or avoided. First, he agreed with the district court's finding that the
Hein Park neighborhood "was developed well before World War II as an
exclusive residential neighborhood for white citizens and these characteristics
have been maintained."'03 Second, Justice Marshall noted that the "undesir-
able traffic" that Hein Park wanted to exclude was predominantly black.'
Third, the closing of West Drive was directly responsive to the efforts of the
whites residing in Hein Park.' From these facts, Justice Marshall sharpened
his disagreement with Justice Stevens's opinion by supporting the trial court's
conclusion at the close of the evidence that the case was basically "'a situation
where an all white neighborhood is seeking to stop the traffic from an over-
whelmingly black neighborhood from coming through their street."" '  Ac-
98. Id. at 119.
99. See Greene v. City of Memphis, 610 F.2d 395,406 (6th Cir. 1979) (Celebrezze, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that municipality does not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1982 by exercising its police
powers to close street when decision is not based on race).
100. Id. (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
101. See id. (Celebrezze, J., dissenting) (arguing that showing of discriminatory intent
should be made to establish § 1982 violation).
102. Id. at 407 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
103. Greene, 451 U.S. at 137 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (quoting App. 148).
104. See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (recognizing that area north of Hein Park was
"predominantly Negro").
105. See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that closing of West Drive "stems entirely
from the efforts of residents of Hein Park").
106. See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with Justice Stevens's characterization
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cording to Justice Marshall, the plain and powerful symbolic message of the
street closing told blacks in essence that "[y~ou must take the long way around
because you don't live in this 'protected' white neighborhood."'" 7 Just as
blacks symbolically represent "undesirable traffic," the protected white
neighborhood symbolically represents the "good neighborhood" whose
tranquility must be preserved.00 In Justice Marshall's view, Justice Stevens's
"slight inconvenience" was in reality "a monument to racial hostility."'09
The Sixth Circuit had interpreted the street closing as "one more of the
many humiliations which society has historically visited" on blacks."' The
appellate court, moreover, viewed the city's decision as representing a badge
or incident of slavery in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment."' It quoted
the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.:
"Some badges of slavery remain today. While the institution has been out-
lawed, it has remained in the minds and hearts of many white men. Cases
which have come to this court depict a spectacle of slavery unwilling to
die.""' 2 To the appellate court, the closing of West Drive represented such a
spectacle, another device leading to the same result.
By endorsing this view in his dissent, Justice Marshall revealed his
palpable agitation over Justice Stevens's discounting the real and symbolic
harms in the case." 3 Argued Justice Marshall, "It is simply unrealistic to
suggest, as does the Court, that the harm suffered by respondents has no more
than 'symbolic significance,' and it defies the lessons of history and law to
assert that if the harm is only symbolic, then the federal courts cannot recog-
nize it.""' 4 In focusing so sharply on symbolic harm, I do not want to under-
state the importance of structural inequality and material deprivation." 5 I see
of evidence) (quoting Tr. 323).
107. Id. at 138 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing perceptions of black residents who
testified at trial).
108. See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (suggesting that true goal of Hein Park residents was
to preserve access for their own vehicles and exclude those operated by blacks).
109. See id. at 139 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing barrier as reinforcing feelings
about city's "favoritism towards whites").
110. Greene v. City of Memphis, 610 F. 2d 395,404 (6th Cir. 1979).
111. See id. at 405 (concluding that erection of barrier constituted badge of slavery
adversely affecting ability of plaintiffs to hold and enjoy their property).
112. Id. at 403 (quoting Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 (1968)).
113. See HowARD BALL,ADEFLANTL FE: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE PERSISTENCE
OF RACISM IN AMERICA 240 (1998) (stating that Justice Marshall was enraged by what he saw
as his colleagues' insensitivity).
114. Greene, 451 U.S. at 152-53 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
115. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Two Ways to Think About Race: Reflections on the Id, the
Ego, and Other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection, 89 GEO. L.J. 2279, 2295-96 (2001)
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a packaged, interlocking subordination that includes symbolic harm, structural
inequality, and material deprivation wherein each of the packaged components
of injury symbiotically reinforces the other. To put it in Iris Young's words,
we must "pluralize concepts of injustice and oppression so that culture be-
comes one of several sites of struggle interacting with others."' 6 In a differ-
ent view, by reducing the harms of structural inequality and material depriva-
tion to merely representational harms, the Court's opinion in Greene blocked
avenues of adequate redress and reduced the reach of rights and remedies far
short of what a racially just society would require."'
Since Greene, the Supreme Court has continued its retrenchment of civil
rights and other antidiscrimination laws that blacks and other people of color
have relied upon to open society." It is very difficult to challenge the Court's
race-neutral explanation and justification of its decisions without doing the
kind of work that Justice Marshall did - deep digging into context and digest-
ing law and society - in his dissent. Much of that work is cultural, a matter
of setting the record straight by reinterpreting facts and attaching proper
significance to representations in a manner that expands legal analysis to a
broader setting. In that setting, we think about culture as an arena for strug-
gles that directly implicate collective interests and political power. In that
setting, we destroy representations of African Americans that are really myths.
We reclaim our moral authority because, as Sonya Rose argues, "morality...
is elaborated in struggle over symbolic power, which is ultimately the power
to define social categories and groups and to establish as legitimate a particu-
lar vision of the social world."'" 9
The difference between Justices Marshall and Stevens implicates what
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann call the "conceptual machineries of
(preferring inquiry into whether structure contributes to material oppression rather than focusing
on cultural meaning); Nancy Fraser, Recognition or Redistribution? A Critical Reading of Iris
Young's Justice and the Politics of Difference, 3 J. POL. PHIL. 166, 166 (1995) (arguing that
political struggle for recognition based on race, gender, or sexuality should not ignore realities
of inequality in access to property and material benefits).
116. Iris Marion Young, Unruly Categories: A Critique of Nancy Fraser's Dual System
Theory, 222 NEW LEFT REV. 147,160 (1977).
117. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 396 (4th ed. 2000)
(arguing that Court's acceptance of adverse racial impacts on basis of racially-neutral grounds
imposes barrier to racial equality).
118. See DAVID E. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME
COURT 456 (1992) (arguing that Rehnquist Court has history of misinterpreting civil rights
legislation by restricting scope of antidiscrimination laws).
119. Sonya 0. Rose, CulturalAnaysis and Moral Discourses: Episodes, Continuities, and
Transformations, in BEYOND THE CULTURAL TURN: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF
SOCIETY AND CULTURE 217,230 (1999).
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universe maintenance."' 2° They argue that the "symbolic universe provides
order for the subjective apprehension of biographical experience."'' At
bottom, this ordering function, by defining "reality," serves to put everything
in its "fright place."' 22 Here, then, the legitimizing function of the symbolic
universe not only justifies things, but also explains things. After all, regulating
traffic is quite different than excluding people on the basis of their race.
In this light, the substantial difference of opinion between Justice Stevens
and Justice Marshall was not a simple factual dispute. In a sense, the disagree-
ment was about power - not naked power, but something more subtle and
masked. As Berger and Luckmann point out, the power issue boils down to
"which of the conflicting definitions of reality will be made to stick." 
23
Justice Stevens trivialized the harm of racism by focusing on slight inconve-
nience, and he reduced black people to actual and metaphorical "unwanted
traffic." Justice Stevens, in his majority opinion, asserted the power to name
reality. He wielded the power to put everything in its proper place - whites in
Hein Park and blacks excluded from Hein Park. Justice Stevens had that
power; Justice Marshall did not. Justice Marshall could only "respectfully
dissent."
However, Berger and Luckmann indicate that dissent in this context at
least demonstrates empirically that the dominant universe is less than inevita-
ble.'24 Thus, Justice Marshall concluded:
I end, then, where I began. Given the majority's decision to characterize the
case as a mere policy decision of the city of Memphis to close a street for
valid municipal reasons, the conclusion that it reaches follows inevitably.
But the evidence inthis case, combined with a dab of common sense, paints
a far different picture from the one emerging from the majority's opinion.
In this picture a group of white citizens has decided to act to keep Negro
citizens from traveling through their urban "utopia" and the city has placed
its seal of approval on the scheme."'2
Generally, the dissenting opinions of Justice Marshall tell the story of
repressed memories and missed opportunities to provide racial justice because
120. PETER L. BERGER & THoMAs LUCKMAN, THE SOCIL. CONSTRUCTION OF REALrrY:
A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 96 (1966) (explaining cognitive construction
in which insiders live without questioning institutional order that arises from process of
subjective reflection).
121. Id. at 90.
122. See id. at 91 (describing function of symbolic universe in encompassing reality within
strict definitions that ward off feelings of "madness and terror").
123. Id. at 100.
124. See id. (explaining that appearance of alternative symbolic universes poses threat to
dominant universe).
125. Greene, 451 U.S. at 155 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
1118
THE LA WAND CULTURE-SHIFT
the dominant sense of reality is too narrow to serve the task. Justice Mar-
shall's dissent in Greene is typical of his role as the Court's conscience; he,
more than any other Justice, was able to see through legal complexities and
grasp real human suffering underneath the abstraction. The dissent demon-
strates how racism gets renamed as something else - something that is facially
neutral, or "colorblind," and easily translatable into something other than
"forbidden discrimination." The Greene decision symptomatically is just the
tip of the iceberg. In fact, the decision may have legitimated the development,
during the 1980s and 1990s, of many communities that have built iron gates
and neighborhood barricades.126 Recently, the Court's conservative majority
has come to adopt the same abstract approach of facial neutrality and
equality - the colorblindness that Patricia Williams aptly characterizes as
"racism in drag" - to severely decontexualize the matter of racial subordina-
tion.27 This approach extricates the racial question from the political, histori-
cal, social, and cultural context in which the legal claim of discrimination
arose. The Court's Greene opinion completely ignored the differentiated
powers and privileges that existed between blacks and whites. Its inquiry was
not deep enough.
Why was Hein Park an exclusively white neighborhood, and why did
black citizens predominantly live in separate urban neighborhoods? In evalu-
ating the closing of West Drive, was the Court to erase patterns of housing
segregation - or to disregard such patterns? How could the Court separate one
action of government - the street closing - from all that surrounded it in terms
of race-based discrimination patterns and then declare it neutral and inconse-
quential? How reminiscent is this of Justice Brown's opinion in Plessy v.
Ferguson," in which he interpreted the separate-but-equal railroad car rule as
if it affected blacks and whites equally and with no acknowledgment of the
history of race-based power and privilege the rule represented? 29 As Justice
Harlan, in his dissent in Plessy reminded the majority, separate cars have
126. See, e.g., Rebecca J. Schwartz, Comment, Public Gated Residential Communities:
The Rosemont, Illinois, Approach and Its Constituional Implications, 29 URB. LAW 123, 124
(1997) (noting that demand for gated communities "has increased dramatically since the early
1980s"); see also EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAEL SNYDER, FoRTREss AMERICA: GATED
AND WAILED CoMMuNrIms IN THE UNITED STATES 152 (1997) (describing gated areas as
concrete metaphor for exclusion of immigrants and minorities).
127. PATRICiA L.J. WILIAMS, THEALCHEMYOF RACE AND RIGHTs 116 (1991) (describing
recent Supreme Court holdings based on "equality" and "neutrality" as "racism in drag").
128. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
129. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (equating argument that legally
enforced separation of races places "badge of inferiority" on blacks with unlikely argument that,
should blacks control legislature, law would place whites in inferior position).
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symbolic meanings in the social and political contexts. 3 ° Similarly, Justice
Marshall reminded the majority in Greene of the symbolic barrier between
black and white neighborhoods that prevents the flow of traffic from the black
neighborhood through the white neighborhood to the public park.' Justice
Stevens's brief acknowledgment and quick dismissal of the residents' argu-
ment that this case was about symbolic meanings and stigma are made all the
worse by his claim that the black citizens' use of that argument trivialized the
purposes of the Thirteenth Amendment.' 32 Unfortunately, in law and society,
so much of today's world is reflected and symbolized by this 1981 decision.
IV The Expanding Regulation of "Unwanted Traffic":
Vignettes Beyond the Bench
The complexity of racism involves more than individualized prejudice or
bias. The most difficult racism to overcome is that which is manifested widely
as socialized ideologies and omnipresent practices that are rooted in a
racialized belief system that is embedded in the nation's white-centered culture
and institutions. Philomena Essed conceptualizes "everyday racism," which
advances our understanding of the contemporary predicament of African
Americans and many other people of color.133 She contends that we must
understand racism as a "system of structural inequalities and a historical
process, both created and recreated through routine practice."' 34 More pre-
cisely, racism is "defined in terms of cognitions, actions and procedures that
contribute to the development and perpetuation of a system" in which one
racial group dominates another.'35 Further, racial domination necessarily
implicates the exercise of racial power. 36 Although individuals from the
dominant group can exercise power over individuals of the dominated group,
that power is dependent on the structural relationship of the two. "mhe
integration of racism into everyday situations through practices (cognitive and
130. See id. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (characterizing separation of citizens on basis
of race to be badge of servitude inconsistent with civil freedom and equality).
131. See Greene, 451 U.S. at 138 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (reasoning that majority
ignored symbolic message of inconvenience as being wholly wedded to prevention of blacks
from traveling through "protected white neighborhood").
132. See id. at 128 (stating that inconvenience did not amount to actual restraint on liberty
of blacks in violation of Thirteenth Amendment).
133. PHILOMENA ESSED, UNDERSTANDING EVERYDAY RAcIsMx AN INTERDISCPiiNARY
THEORY 1 (1991) (introducing study of pervasive impact of racism on blacks in everyday life).
134. Id. at 39.
135. Id.
136. See id. (arguing that conceptualization of everyday racism may benefit from domina-
tion as exercise of power).
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behavioral) that activate underlying power relations" manifests the process of
racism."' Essed's theory enables us to understand how individual events and
acts may be virtually insignificant in isolation because each "instantiation of
everyday racism has meaning only in relation to the whole complex of relations
and practices.'"3 Moreover, to the degree that everyday racism becomes
normalized and widespread, we can associate it with institutional and cultural
manifestations of racism." 9 Thus, in terms of jurisprudence, prohibiting
individual acts of disparate treatment may force a somewhat positive shift in
our culture of discrimination without really advancing much of a shift in our
culture of racism.
The vignettes presented below illustrate everyday racism within the
larger context of what Andrew Kemohan describes as "cultural oppres-
sion," by which he means "the social transmission offalse beliefs, values, and
ideals about how to live, and the attitudes, motivations, behavior patterns, and
institutions that depend on them."' 4° The construction of nonwhites as un-
wanted traffic illustrates how cultural oppression is an articulation and prac-
tice of white power, something that the liberal paradigm of human agency
seems unwilling to accept. 4' While that paradigm can recognize power
within the hands of individuals and institutions, it fails to recognize it within
137. Id. at 50.
138. Id. at 52.
139. See JAMES M. JONES, PREJUDICE AND RACISM 13-15 (2d ed. 1997) (describing
relationship among individual, institutional, and cultural racism that makes "colorblind"
approach unlikely to eradicate racism); Anthony Cook, Cultural Racism and the Limits of
Rationality in the Saga of Rodney King, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 297, 300 (1993) (noting that
individuals and institutions "engage in both overt and covert racism"); Peggy C. Davis, Law as
Microagression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1560 (1989) (favoring claim that unconscious racism is
pervasive in American culture); Charles R. Lawrence II, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protec-
tion: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (arguing that
traditional notions of intent do not reflect fact that subconscious cultural ideas and attitudes
often influence racial decisions); Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct
and a New Theory ofRacial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717,1723 (2000) (offering theory
of racism focusing on how organizational activity creates institutional racism even when
individual group members lack any conscious discriminatory intent).
140. ANDREWKERNOHANLIBERAUSM,EQUAUTY,ANDCULTURALOPPRSSION 13(1998).
141. According to Kemohan, the concept of cultural oppression
connect[s] liberalism's theoretical discourse to the theoretical discourse of those
movements for social change that are fighting for a type of equality that liberal
theory has had trouble understanding. The first task is to make these concerns
visible in liberal theory .... Cultural oppression is a form of power, and liberal
theorists have generally given up on using the concept of power in their analyses.
Id. at 14.
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cultural practices.'42 However, our understanding of racist practices must
situate them within the latter as well as the former. Everyday practices that
are manifestations of cultural oppression reflect subtle, diffuse manifestations
of racism. 43 Within the white world of routine, the realm of everyday prac-
tices in which whites "simply [do] their jobs [and live] their lives,"'" their
negative images of people of color are ridiculously over-inclusive, representing
"a wide range of misconceptions and myths," which some scholars characterize
as "sincere fictions" that serve as "the make-believe foundation.., for white
dominance and supremacy." 4 ' In the following four vignettes, this phenome-
non plays out in concrete settings.
A. Public Accommodations at the Adam's Mark Hotel Chain
On May 20, 1999, plaintiffs filed a federal lawsuit in Florida that charged
the Adam's Mark Daytona Beach Resort, one of the more luxurious hotels in
the area, with discrimination against African Americans who were in Daytona
Beach as part of the Black College Reunion." The lawsuit claims that in
providing public accommodations, the hotel engaged in disparate treatment
of blacks and whites. 4 ' Among other things, the suit alleges that the hotel
overcharged the event's participants for rooms and required full payment in
142. See Charles R. Lawrence I, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal
Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 928, 949-58 (2001) (criticizing liberal
defense of affirmative action for not challenging ways in which traditional notions of merit
perpetuate race and class distinctions).
143. As Iris Marion Young explains:
I have suggested that oppression is the inhibition of a group through a vast network
of everyday practices, attitudes, assumptions, behaviors, and institutional rules; it
is structural or systemic. The systemic character of oppression implies that an
oppressed group need not have a correlate oppressing group. While structural
oppression in our society involves relations among groups, these relations do not
generally fit the paradigm of one group's consciously and intentionally keeping
another down .... The conscious actions of many individuals daily contribute to
maintaining and reproducing oppression, but those people are usually simply doing
their jobs or living their lives, not understanding themselves as agents of oppres-
sion.
KERNOHAN, supra note 140, at 16-17 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Iris Marion Young,
Five Faces of Oppression, in RETHINKING POWER 3 (T.E. Wartenberg ed., 1992)).
144. Id.
145. JoE R. FEAGINET AL., WHITE RACISM: THm BASICS 4 (2d ed. 2001).
146. See Sue Schultz, Justice Department Files Discrimination SuitAgainst Hotel Chain,
DURHAM HERU:D-SUN, Dec. 17, 1999, at A13 (reporting that Justice Department filed federal
discrimination suit against Adam's Mark Hotel chain alleging it discriminated against black
guests in twenty-one hotels nationwide).
147. Id.
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advance by check or money order, a $100 refundable damage deposit, a $25
deposit to have room telephones activated, and a $300 deposit for access to
minibars.'" The lawsuit contends that none of these policies applied to
whites.
149
Perhaps worst of all, the lawsuit asserts that Adam's Mark required
blacks who stayed at the hotel during the reunion to wear bright orange
wristbands to indicate that they were guests and to buy an additional wrist-
band, at $50 each, for anyone who wanted to visit them. 5° The lawsuit asserts
that uniformed officers from the Daytona Beach Police Department and
Volusia County Sheriff's Office were out in force at the hotel to make sure
blacks were wearing their wristbands.' In one report, twenty-eight year-old
hotel guest Napoleon Berian said, "I felt like I was in county jail the whole
weekend." ' 2 Another guest, Latoya Straughn, also twenty-eight, said she
attended the reunion with three female friends and that they opted to wear the
"cheap plastic" orange bands on their ankles, rather than on their wrists where
they would have clashed with their clothes. 53 As a result, Straughn said,
"every five feet, and/or every ten minutes," an officer would ask her for proof
that she was a registered guest.'54 Unsurprisingly, many plaintiffs claimed
that during the weekend they repeatedly noticed that white guests were not
wearing wristbands and were not being challenged.
155
The actions of the hotel followed an earlier attempt by the City Council
to implement a plan that would have authorized the police to stop all traffic
heading over the six bridges leading onto the commercial beach strip.5 6
Officers were to allow only those who held passes - residents, employees of
city businesses, and hotel guests - to drive across the bridges.' The NAACP
sued the city, and federal district judge Patricia Fawcett issued an injunction
barring the city from instituting its so-called traffic plan on the grounds that
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According to lawyers representing the black guests in the lawsuit against
Adam's Mark, executives of the hotel were among the most vociferous in
demanding that the city act to halt the Black College Reunion.'59 The lawyers
claim that after the judge threw out Daytona Beach's traffic plan, the hotel
executives decided to make the event so unpleasant that black people would
not come back."6 The mental anguish, humiliation, and embarrassment that
result from this kind of racism has been described as "spirit murder.'' 6  The
Adam's Mark incident illustrates the advanced application of the symbolic
representation of black people as "unwanted traffic" - unwanted even as
young professionals who were paying customers at a luxurious hotel. 62 As




161. Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse ofFingerpointing
as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAM L. REV. 127, 128 (1987) (recounting incident
in which black law professor was not buzzed into Benetton store in New York City during
regular business hours even though white shoppers were inside).
162. See Regina Austin, 'A Nation of Thieves": Securing Black People's Right to Shop
and to Sell in WhiteAmerica, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 147, 148 ("There can hardly be a black person
in urban America who has not been denied entry to a store, closely watched, snubbed, ques-
tioned about her or his ability to pay for an item, or stopped and detained for shoplifting.");
Loren Page Ambinder, Note, Dispelling the Myth of Rationality: Racial Discrimination in
Taxicab Service and the Efficacy ofLitigation Under 42 U.S. C. § 1981,64 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
342, 359-60 (1996) (presenting results of study of taxi service in Washington, D.C., that showed
blacks were more likely than whites to be denied taxi service and had to wait longer than whites
when given service); Stephen Labattron, Denny's Restaurants to Pay $54 Million in Race Bias
Suits, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1994, at Al (describing lawsuit in which restaurant kept black
Secret Service agents waiting for table while seating and serving white agents); Courtland
Milloy, Teen Stripped of More than Just a Shirt, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1995, at DI (reporting
that black teenager, shopping in Eddie Bauer, had to surrender shirt that he purchased day
before because he had no receipt); Avis to Pay $3.3M in Discrimination Case, FT. LAUDERDALE
SUN SENTINEL, Dec. 23, 1997, at 2D (reporting that company settled discrimination lawsuit
alleging that it placed extra restrictions on black drivers).
163. Michael . Sniffen, Hotel Chain Agrees to Pay $8M to Settle Racial Bias Lawsuits,
DuRHAM HERALD-SUN, Mar. 22, 2000, at A5 (reporting that Adam's Mark hotel chain agreed
to pay damages, revise policies, and seek minority customers in settlement of racial discrimina-
tion lawsuits). With the Bush administration now overseeing the settlement, the Justice
Department is considering lifting some provisions of the settlement order at the request of Fred
S. Kummer, the chairman of HBE Corporation, which operates Adam's Mark Hotels and
Resorts, a chain of twenty-four hotels, including the one in Daytona Beach. See Neil A. Lewis,
Justice Dept. Weighs Lifting an Anti-Bias Order on Hotels, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22,2002, at A16
(reporting Justice Department's statement that it was considering "ending" order forcing Adams
Mark to comply with settlement order). Mr. Kummer is "a longtime friend and supporter of
Attorney General John Ashcroft." Id.
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B. Dubuque, Iowa, and the Failed Recruitment of a Few Good
Blacks (a.k.a. "Unwanted Traffic')
In the spring of 1991, the Dubuque, Iowa Human Rights Commission
unanimously approved a plan proposed by the local Constructive Integration
Task Force." The title of this plan was "We Want Change," and it was
designed to attract about 100 black families over a five-year period, bringing
in twenty families per year.'65 Blacks constituted less than one percent of the
city's total population of about 58,000, and "the task force members felt the
city should make a symbolic gesture of recruiting black families to overcome
Dubuque's lack of diversity."'" Moreover, the plan was a response to the
burning of a black family's garage in October of 1989, in which a cross and
the words "KKK lives" were found. 67 The very modest recruitment plan
entailed an intention to have employers "lure black workers to fill vacant jobs
in the city."'168 Additionally, the task force explicitly supported the desire to
attract black professionals to the city.
69
Two things stand out in viewing the events in Dubuque: the modest
nature of the plan - twenty black families a year for five years to fill vacant
jobs - and the extraordinary backlash that the plan generated. As reported by
Joe Feagin, Heran Vera, and Pinar Batur, "Aggressive white responses in-
cluded a dozen cross-burnings and bricks thrown through the windows of
black homes. Cross-burnings also occurred in other Iowa cities, including Des
Moines, Waterloo, Jefferson, and Iowa City."' 70 The white men who were
arrested for the Dubuque incidents viewed the burning crosses "as symbols of
the white community's alarm at the job losses that the perpetrators assumed
would result from the recruitment plan."'' In addition to the cross-burnings
and incidents of vandalism, hate letters and racist graffiti were sent to local
black residents and white supporters of the recruitment plan.' The dozen or
so black students at the local Dubuque Senior High School (which had 1,471
white students) were racially harassed, and police officers had to patrol the
164. The following account of the Dubuque, Iowa story draws upon the case study in
FEAGIN ET AL., supra note 145, at 36-53.
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hallways to protect the black students from white violence. 73 Moreover, in
1991 and 1992, the local Telegraph Herald carried a number of angry letters
by people who were "opposed to the recruitment of, or even the presence of,
black families."'74
In the Adam's Mark hotel case, white reaction to blacks was probably
driven by aversion and resentment at their temporary presence in sharing the
hotel accommodations. In Dubuque, the driving force behind the white
reaction was probably fear. But who or what did many of the whites fear?
The few black recruits were no real threat to white jobs or centers of domi-
nance. Recall that the few black recruits - 300-400 people in 100 families -
were to be professional people, not the stereotypical criminal or welfare
recipient. As Feagin, Vera, and Batur point out, some of the white fear of
blacks was based on stereotypes and the unknown rather than actual experi-
ence or relationships with blacks.17
C. Latino Day Laborers: Handy "Visual Pollution"
in Brewster, New York
During the 1980s, my wife, our two children, and I often traveled to the
suburb of Brewster, New York, to visit my sister-in-law, Jane. The town was
beautiful, and the people were always cordial. I enjoyed my visits to the town,
which was an hour's train ride north of New York City and mostly populated
by whites. I was therefore surprised to read of recent incidents involving
Latino day laborers. Reportedly, the town's sidewalks have become "im-
promptu hiring halls where [Latino] immigrants gather each morning [to wait]
for contractors to hire them for the day.""' The immigrants often help resi-
173. Id.
174. Id. at39.
175. See id. at 50 (discussing probable cause of whites' fear of blacks in Dubuque). Other
scholars have noted that fear of the unknown black is often a case of isolation of whites from
blacks. For a telling figure of the extent of some whites' isolation from blacks, consider that
in 1990 half of the nation's counties were 99% white. See JIM MYERS, AFRAID OF TE DARK:
WHAT WHITES AND BLACKS NEED TO KNOW ABouT EACH OmER 44 (2000) (exploring race
issues in America). Moreover, according to the 1990 Census, the following nine states had a
less than 1% black population: Vermont (0.3), Idaho (0.3), Montana (0.3), Maine (0.4), South
Dakota (0.5), North Dakota (0.5), New Hampshire (0.6), Utah (0.7), and Wyoming (0.8). Id.
Oregon's population was only 1.6% black. Id. To counter fear and ignorance, some scholars
have suggested human relations training. See generally JuDrIH H. KATZ, WHE AWARENESS:
HANDBOOK FOR ANI-RACISM TRAINING 3 (1978) (presenting group training program designed
to alter racist attitudes and encourage behavioral change).
176. Matthew Purdy, Where Laborers Are Handy but Shunned, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21,
1999, at 45.
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dents with odd jobs such as mowing grass or building stonewalls.'" According
to Tony Hay, the chairman of the Legislature in Putnam County, a county that
is ninety-five percent white, "'There's a cultural difference between Americans
and Latinos. We don't stand on the street looking for work. The average
person will wake up at 8 o'clock and go to work. They wake up and go stand
on the street comer and look for work. I call it visual pollution."'178 This
expression of "suburban xenophobia" 79 translates unwanted traffic into visual
pollution.
Hay has asked federal immigration officials to address what he sees as
an "illegal immigration problem" to keep it from "plagu[ing] our commu-
nity. ' "° Hay's vision is downright cataclysmic: "The World Trade Center
blew up [referring to the 1993 attack], planes are blown out of the sky," he
said."" "I'm not saying it's Latinos, but they're all immigrants. The West
Nile virus, they laugh at me, but we don't know where that came from. If
Saddam Hussein shaved his mustache and spoke Spanish, he could come here
and stand on the streets of Brewster. Muammar Qaddafi, he could come
here."182 Here, Latino people looking for work are characterized as intruders
who spread disease and engage in terrorism. Unwanted traffic, indeed.
Another town citizen, Tom Opdyke, the owner of Bagel Depot opposite
the train station, said, "Until Tony Hay made a statement, everybody else had
their head in the sand." 83 He added that women are afraid of being harassed
and that some of the immigrant job seekers urinate in public. 84 Some in
Brewster seem to want Latinos to do their chores, but they do not want
Latinos to live around them. Many in Brewster find Hay's statements to be
"very hateful" and reflective of "big-time prejudice."' 85 But, of course, Hay's
bigotry probably causes the deepest injury to the area's minority groups
themselves. A gentleman named Lone Hawk of White Plains and the
Gwich'in Nation of Native Americans said that the debate over Latino immi-
grants grieved him: "This is our land. We lived in peace until the white man
177. Id.
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came." 8 6 As reporter Matthew Purdy wryly concludes, Lone Hawk "was
generous enough not to ask everyone to leave." ' 7
D. Bad Asian Neighbors: "Model Minority" Be Damned
Because Asians have been relatively successful in their access to the
mainstream opportunity structure, it is difficult for some to see how they
might constitute "unwanted traffic." Paradoxically, however, many in society
view Asians not only as "a model minority" that is well positioned to assimi-
late successfully, but also as permanent foreigners who threaten the nation's
social fabric. These images clashed in dramatic fashion in a case of housing
discrimination that involved Asian American students at Stanford Univer-
sity.188 When the students sought to rent off-campus housing in the neighbor-
ing suburb of Menlo Park, their Stanford, model-minority credentials did not
enable them to avoid being denied housing, although they recovered $300,000
in settlement of their fair housing claim.8 9 The landlord allegedly told the
women students that she already had "good, white American applicants" and
that "you people are ruining this country."'"
V Reclaiming a Place in the Humanizing Struggle
of the Civil Rights Community and Moving Toward Racial Comity
In addressing this discussion to whites, I am not trying to reach hard-core
racists or those who lie about their true racist feelings. Even milder references
to "modem" or "aversive" racism still implicate racism as a scary term, better
left unmentioned, that may alienate my audience and cause them to stop
hearing whatever I say after I utter the term racism. Indeed, Paul Wachtel
argues compellingly that in lieu of the vague characterizations of modem
racism, we should instead focus on white indifference.19' I, however, do not
186. Id.
187. Id. Small town xenophobia, such as that found in Brewster, is not an isolated
occurrence. A state legislator in Kentucky recently blamed so-called illegal Hispanic immi-
grants residing in Kentucky for the spread of disease. See Laura M. Padilla, "But You're Not
a Dirty Mexican": Internalized Oppression, Latinos & Law, 7 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL'Y 59, 62
n.10 (2001) (stating that legislator accused illegal Hispanic immigrants of being responsible for
spread of disease in state and for emptying food stocks of local charities (citing John Cheves,
Legislator Slams Illegal Immigrants, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Mar. 14, 2000, at Al)).
188. See Carolyne Zinko, Stanford Students Settle Housing Suit Over Racial Slurs, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 11, 1998, at A17 (reporting settlement of lawsuit in which landlord agreed to pay
$300,000 to five Asian American victims who were object of landlord's racial slurs).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See PAUL L. WACHTEL, RACE IN THE MIND OF AMERICA: BREAKING THE Vicious
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really see the bright-line distinction between aspects of racism and race-
neutral indifference. I think that when we ask why so many whites are indif-
ferent to blacks, some variant of racism will creep back into the story. Unlike
Wachtel, who seems to neutralize indifference as it is directed to otherness,
I tend to see indifference as racialized, as driven by bias, prejudice, and
stereotype - by cultural and institutional racisms - all leading to an anti-black
sentiment that divides. But I really do not know. What I would most like to
know is how to recruit better-intentioned whites - the innocent bystanders -
to fight against racism and for a more open society, a more inclusive multira-
cial democracy, and a world of social justice.
In another attempt to facilitate conversations about race/ism, Robert
Entman and Andrew Rojecki's study of race and the media in Indianapolis
convinced them that whites have "a complex amalgam of ideas and feelings
better labeled as ambivalence or animosity than racism."' 92 Set out below is
Entman and Rojecki's table titled: "Spectrum of White Racial Sentiment." '193
Racial progress is represented as one reads from the table's right-hand column
to that on the left. I invite white readers, as well as Asian and Latina/o
readers, to situate themselves within the different columns along the spectrum.
The table characterizes white racial sentiment in terms of comity, ambiv-
alence, animosity, and racism regarding the beliefs that are associated with the
four references that run down the far left side of the table: the degree of black
negative homogeneity, the degree to which structural impediments exist to
black opportunity, and the existence and degree of group conflict between
blacks and whites. Also at bottom left, sentiment is measured in terms of
white emotional responses to blacks, ranging from comfort, disquiet, fear and
anger, to hatred.
CIRcLE BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHrrES 35 (1999) (exploring psychological underpinnings of
continuing racial divisions). He contends:
What is perhaps most important of all for whites to acknowledge and understand
is indifference. A great deal of what is often characterized as racism can be more
precisely and usefully described as indifference. Perhaps no other feature of white
attitudes, and of the underlying attitudinal structure of white society as a whole, is
as cumulatively responsible for the pain and privation experienced by our nation's
black minority at this point in our history as is indifference. At the same time,
perhaps no feature is as misunderstood or overlooked .... It severs the sinews and
nerves of society without announcing itself Its effects are devastating, but its
tracks are hidden in the overall attitude of "each man for himself' that is so promi-
nent a part of our society's ethos.
Id. at 3 5-36.
192. ROBERT M. ENTMAN & ANDREW RojEcKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND:
MEDIA AND RACE IN ANMERICA 16 (2000).
193. Id. at 18 tbl.2.1.
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Table 1: Spectrum of White Racial Sentiment
Comity Ambivalence Animosity Racism
Individual Negative Stereotyping Hierarchy
Diversity Tendencies
Negative Individual Black individu- Most Blacks Blacks are a
Homoge- Blacks, like als tend more share a lower order
neity Whites, vary than Whites to syndrome of of humanity
widely in traits exhibit negative traits than Whites,
negative traits with consis-
tently nega-
tive traits
Empathy Underestima- Denial Separation &
tion Discrimina-
tion
Structural Discrimination Discrimination Anti-Black Blacks can-
Impedi- remains preva- may occur in discrimination not attain
ments lent, causing isolated is a thing of the equality no
great harm to individual past; Whites matter what
equal opportu- instances now experi- society does;
nity ence more discrimina-
racial discrimi- tion is
nation therefore
necessary
Political Political Political Political
Acceptance Concern Rejection Aggression
Conflicting Fundamental Black political Black political Black politi-
Group interests of power some- power extracts cal power
Interests Blacks and times creates advantages at poses grave
Whites do not trouble for White ex- dangers to
differ; cooper- Whites as a pense; cooper- Whites as a
ation possible group; cooper- ation rarely to group;
and desirable ation suspect mutual cooperation
advantage dangerous
Comfort Disquiet Fear & Anger Hatred
Emotional Low intensity, Low intensity Largely nega- Intensely and
Responses positive or oscillation from tive, moder- globally neg-
neutral neutral to posi- ately intense ative emo-
feelings tive to negative emotions tions toward
Blacks
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In looking at the racial thinking that runs across the spectrum from racial
comity and understanding to flat-out racism, Entman and Rojecki find that
most whites express either the sentiment of ambivalence or animosity and
more express the former than the latter. Whites in the far right column, the
racists, are beyond help and stand outside my analysis. I worry that their
number is underestimated, but I leave that discussion for another time. The
hope for a better day lies in trying to move whites from ambivalence to
comity, while preventing whites moving from left to right along the spectrum,
that is, from ambivalence to animosity and, worse, from animosity to racism.
At one point, I thought that I might want to recruit those who feel animosity
toward blacks, but upon a closer reading I do not see that as viable.194
Entman and Rojecki urge that we seek the dictionary meaning of comity,
which is "courtesy, civility; kindly and considerate behavior towards
others.1195 In their view, "Comity would allow Whites and Blacks [and other
racial and ethnic groups as well, I presume] to see common interests and
values more readily and thus to cooperate in good faith to achieve mutually
beneficial objectives."'1 9' The move toward comity would help to present a
context that could "nurture a virtuous circle of respect, empathy, and generos-
ity to replace the vicious circle of suspicion, separation, and stinginess."' 9
Thus, I direct my attention to the ambivalent majority of whites. As Entman
and Rojecki note, this group of whites "are people with good intentions who
are somehow stymied from achieving them. ' " As we review column two
(ambivalence) of the spectrum of white racial sentiment, we note that emo-
tionally this group oscillates from neutral to positive to negative. Although
those in this group perceive negative traits among blacks, they also at least
194. According to Entman and Rojecki:
Racial animosity occupies an important step short of racism. Although those
exhibiting animosity often get labeled as racists, they do not see their stereotyped
anti-Black generalizations as adding up to a natural racial order that places Whites
on top and legitimizes discrimination. Rather, animosity... boils down to stereo-
typing, denial, political rejection and demonization, and fearful, angry emotions.
Id. at 19.
As I look down column three, I would place in this category Mr. Luckman, the letter
writer to the St. Petersburg Herald. See supra text accompanying note 43 (containing
Luckman's complaint that newspaper was exacerbating racial problem). Entman and Rojecki,
more optimistic than I, feel that those with racial animosity can change because the animosity
is not rooted "in intense personal needs and motivations," but rather in "ignorance, confusion,
and anxiety." ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 192, at 21.
195. ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 192, at 11 (quoting Oxford English Dictionary).
196. Id. at 11-12.
197. Id. at 12.
198. Id. at33.
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acknowledge that racial discrimination occurs (albeit in isolated individual
instances). They reject stereotypes and racial hierarchy, and they view con-
flicting interests between whites and blacks as occasional. I think ambivalent
whites would include "aversive racists," whites who consciously embrace
egalitarian, non-racist ideals, but who also possess unacknowledged negative
sentiments about blacks. They might vote for Colin Powell to be President, but
would be reluctant to sit next to a black on the subway or bus.'" According to
Rupert Brown, aversive racists hold, along with liberal principles of equality
and tolerance, "some residual anxiety in their dealings with minority group
members, an unease stemming from culturally socialized negative images
associated with them.""0 This anxiety colors interaction between whites and
nonwhites, leading to avoidance, detachment, coolness, and general fatigue
over issues of race.0 1 I would include aversive racists among the whites I am
recruiting to the cause of social justice, although I realize that the description
of whites as any kind of racist is problematic.
In looking at the interviews presented by Entman and Rojecki, the
ambivalent whites appear generally to move back and forth between ambiva-
lence and animosity rather than between ambivalence and comity. Interview-
ees would often express sentiments that reflected a conflict with their experi-
ences. Typical is the response of a forty-five year-old teacher's aide:
Q: What kind of picture do you think TV news gives of Black
people? What do we learn about Blacks from TV news?
A: I think most of it's a lot of negatives.
Q: In what way?
A: Just the violence and the welfare stories are always negative
about Blacks. And I think they get a lot of bad press. Be-
cause I don't see that in the people that I deal with. And I
think that's unfair that they do get a lot of negative press.
But then a lot of the violence and stuff they do to themselves!
Q: So you think those stories are accurate?
199. Malcolm Gladwell, The Subtler Shades of Racism: Private Emotions Lag Behind
Public Discourse, WASH. POST, July 15, 1991, at A3 (describing aversive racism as "the
subconscious, discriminatory acts and feelings of people who genuinely don't want to be that
way"). The theory of aversive racism was primarily developed in Samuel L. Oaertner & John
F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in PREiUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 61
(1986). Entman and Rojecki do not place aversive racists on their spectrum, but observe that
they would fit in "at some point between the extremes on the scale from racism to comity."
ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 192, at 17.
200. RUPERT BROWN, PREJUrDICE: ITS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 227 (1995).
201. Id.
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A: I think for the most part they're accurate, but I think they
bring it on themselves.2"
According to Entman and Rojecki, "[a]n accretion of consistent, race-domi-
nated imagery from newscasts has created in these respondents' minds an
enduring stereotype that defeats their otherwise sympathetic impulses."203
In a focus group meeting of whites at Drew University, one participant,
Christina, observed,
Whenever the news shows the latest crime, it's always a black person
who's committed it .... I try not to think of them as a culture that's
violent, but you can't help but think that as a culture they're completely
violent, when you look at TV and the videos on MTV - guns, violence.
They're talking about guns and shooting their women and shooting white
women .... Sometimes I think it is true, that black people do commit
crimes more than white people. Or maybe you just hear about it more. I
don't know which one it is, but it is truly frightening.24
I am stunned at a particularly stark recollection of Christina's: "I remem-
ber when we were younger, before we'd go out, it would always be like a big
joke: Do you have your nigger-be-good stick? Which is like just a stick, but
it was used to beat up black people, so it was called a 'nigger-be-good
stick.' 2 5 This was "a big joke"? It was "just a stick"? Worse, the violent
stereotype extends beyond white fear; it really reinforces the caricatures of
blacks as subhuman - grotesquely unwanted traffic.2"
VI. Conclusion: Keep Hope Alive!
Many people have asked me over the years why my legal writing con-
stantly implores one "to keep the faith" and "to keep hope alive" when I tell
such depressing stories about racism. Critics might ask the same question
because, in their view, I am such a thin-skinned racial whiner. But, as I have
learned from Charles Lawrence and other progressives, "Transformative
202. ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 192, at 35.
203. Id.
204. DAvID K. SHIPLER, A COUNTRY OF STRANGERS: BLAcKS AND WHrrEs iN AMERICA
361 (1997).
205. Id. at 360. Shipler reports that unsolicited comments by whites about race usually
come to him in three forms: (1) complaints about incompetent blacks getting preference in
hiring; (2) laments about violence and disorder in inner-city schools and neighborhoods; and
(3) various stories of whites being victimized as the object of black racism. Id. at 459.
206. Id. at 360. See generally LEONARD CASSUTO, THE INHUMAN RACE: THE RACIAL
GROTESQUE INAMERICAN LrrERATURE AND CULTURE, at xiii-xiv (1997) (providing commentary
on racial objectification).
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politics requires looking beyond winning or losing the particular legal dispute
or political battle and asking how one's actions serve to reinforce people's
awareness of our interdependence and mutual responsibility as members of
the human family."'207 To reach racial comity, all of us, nonwhite and white,
must reject the culture of oppression - actually have the gumption to go out
and fight it everyday.
We must recommit to the humanizing aspects of the civil rights move-
ment as it was organically connected to a larger movement for freedom,
justice, and human dignity. However, the translation of the movement into a
set of legalisms curtailed the promises of freedom, justice, and human dignity
even as it offered equality before the law. The true tragedy of the civil rights
movement is that it was too quickly disconnected from the humanizing aspects
of the struggle that marked its origins and animated it."ca Out of a diverse,
expansive civil rights community, time and energy devoted to law reform
prevailed over other aspects of the community's activities. Once severed from
the larger community, law was easily cabined, justice easily delayed, and
racist resistance easily enabled.
When I think of the civil rights community, I have in mind Vincent
Harding's sense of community - "a way of being which encourages cohesion,
mutual responsibility, compassion, integrity, and justice."2" In Harding's
view, "[I]t is possible for us to look at the heart of this powerful humanizing
social movement and discover a profound quest in which all legal rights
become essentially openings toward a more humane community."'2 1 I think
we are all so tired and beat down from the travail of racism - the experience
of racism and the claims that it generates - that most of us really yearn for
comity, for the more humane community, in a national sense. We must put
indifference and fear aside. We may have to forget all that we think we know
about each other and start over again. I think we can reimagine, reinvent, and
reestablish America as a place of racial comity."' Although much more is
207. Lawrence, supra note 142, at 965.
208. See generalyCLAYBORNE CARSON, IN STRUGGLE: SNCC AND THE BLACKAWAKEN-
ING OF THE 1960S (1981) (tracing development and impact of Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee); DAVID GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARnN LUrHER KING, JR., AND THE
SoUTHmN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIp CONFERENCE (1986) (detailing contributions of Martin
Luther King, Jr., and Southern Christian Leadership Conference); AIDON MORRIS, THE ORIGINS
OF THE Civi. RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK COMMUN1TIEs ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE (1984)
(chronicling first decade of southern civil rights movement); BELINDA ROBNETr, How LONG?
How LONG?: AFRIcAN-AMElCANWOMENIN THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVILRIGHrS (1997) (analyz-
ing African American women's activities within and contributions to civil rights movement).
209. Harding, supra note 1, at 17.
210. Id.
211. As a start, respond personally to the following questions:
1134
THE LA WAND CULTURE-SHIFT
necessary, in these difficult racial times, I am not, at this point asking for
anything more.
Beyond formalized equality of opportunity, the larger promise of the civil
rights movement was directed to a profound culture-shift. And though not
perfectly manifested, that culture-shift is a significant legacy of the Warren
Court's race jurisprudence. It is, to be sure, a contested legacy, but one worth
fighting for rather than against. But this is difficult business, no matter how
you choose to enter the fray. In February 2002, 1 participated in a continuing
legal education program - a "Festival of Legal Learning" it is called - that my
law school sponsored. I presented a one-hour class that raised some of the
issues addressed in this Article, discussing the vignettes and handing out a
copy of Entman and Rojecki's spectrum of racial resentment. The audience
reception was mixed. However, I see that as a positive because I left thinking
that the evaluations of my presentation would be decidedly negative." 2 True
enough, some wrote on the evaluation forms: "I thought it would be a discus-
sion of Warren Court cases, but it wasn't"; 'Not law - Just anecdotal 'evi-
dence' about how 'Whitey' is evil"; "Most biased instructor I have ever seen
at the Festival"; and "Drivel." '213 But there were other views as well: "Out-
standing lecture!"; "Exceeded my expectations"; "Excellent!! Thank you for
such a thought-provoking and engaging discussion."2 4  There were two
positive evaluations that were more elaborate. According to one, "Brilliantly
summarized his theory and fear... stomach turning examples, extremely open
" What messages did your parents communicate to you about race?
" How does this differ from the way you communicate with your children about
race?
" In what ways do you organize your identity and resources around race? How
consciously does race affect your choice of where to live, shop, or send your
children to school?
" For the first time, a majority of blacks and whites support the idea of integra-
tion, but ideas of what constitutes integration differ. What would be the ideal
percentage breakdown for you between people of your race and of others in a
neighborhood in which you lived? What is the actual percentage breakdown
in your neighborhood? What would be the tipping point, the point at which the
racial balance [becomes] uncomfortable enough to make you want to leave the
neighborhood?
• Is affirmative action an appropriate way of redressing racial inequities in this
country?
" What is your race?
Betsy Hubbard et al., Hungry Mind Review Questionnaire, in CIVIL RIGHTS AND RACE RELA-
TIONS IN THE POST REAGAN-BUSH ERA 189, 190 (Samuel L. Myers, Jr., ed., 1997).
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to & tolerant of questions that displayed lack of understanding, kept communi-
cation open effectively in a large group, extremely patient with racist ques-
tions. Classy presentation !,,215 The other stated, "Excellent, brilliant organi-
zation & presentation. Comments to Calmore: you were not overstating these
as incidents of racism. You handled uninformed, racist comments from the
audience with grace. Implicit in several of the comments was the assumption
that the blacks through prior conduct had brought this racism upon them-
selves. 2 6 I imagine that the reception of this Article will be similarly mixed.
Still, in both the Article and the festival of learning, the lessons are that,
across the racial divide, we must keep communication open, be tolerant of one
another's ignorance and awkward questions, remain extremely patient with
each other, not overstate or understate incidents of racism, and, perhaps most
of all, handle the difficult moments with grace.
George Fredrickson reminds us that "race relations are not so much a
fixed pattern as a changing set of relationships that can only be understood
within a broader historical context that is itself constantly evolving and thus
altering the terms under which whites and nonwhites interact."2 7 In this
Article, I have presented people of color as they live the experience of domi-
nant constructions of them as unwanted traffic - (1) blacks being rerouted
around the white neighborhood of Hein Park in Memphis; (2) young black
professionals being denied equal public accommodations at a luxury hotel in
Daytona Beach; (3) blacks being rendered unwelcome in Dubuque, Iowa;
(4) Latino day laborers being associated by a town official with potential
plague and terrorism in Brewster, New York; and (5) Asian students at
Stanford University being subjected to housing discrimination in Menlo Park,
California, because their people were "ruining" the country. In these disparate
examples, from across the nation, the common theme is the regulation of
people of color as "unwanted traffic." Taking a note from Fredrickson, I have
intended these varied cases to illustrate the continuing historical and contem-
porary contexts within which nonwhites are racialized and how "unwanted
traffic" is a significant "term[] under which white and nonwhite interact."
218
In this sense, the regulation of people of color as unwanted traffic is
associated with an aspect of white racism that Feagin, Vera, and Batur de-
scribe as "the socially organized set of practices, attitudes, and ideas that deny
African Americans and other people of color the privileges, dignity, opportu-
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STrDY IN AMER-
ICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY, at xvii (1981) (comparing race relations throughout United
States and South African history).
218. Id.
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nities, freedoms, and rewards that this nation offers to white Americans. ' '219
Moreover, the social construction wreaks havoc with a viable concept of
equality of opportunity. The racially unimpeded access to the basic opportu-
nity structure that rewards whites is often a matter that whites can take for
granted, provided that they simply work hard and play by the rules. There is
a place not only for them, but also for all who follow suit - unless, of course,
you are deemed to be unwanted traffic that must be regulated.
Old-school racism and legally forbidden discrimination have been
divorced from an unacknowledged white bonding on issues of race that serves
to benefit and privilege whites materially and psychologically. 220 That bond-
ing reinforces a silent commitment to prevent many African Americans, who
are socially and culturally constructed as unwanted traffic, from traveling
through "their white utopia," to use Justice Marshall's words.221 The con-
struction of blacks as unwanted traffic does not build primarily on either fear
or hate, even though they are factors. Rather, at bottom, the characterization
of blacks as unwanted traffic stems from a belief in the inferiority of black
people - of African Americans, more precisely. The inferiority may be
deemed biological, cultural, or moral. While this is really a packaged concep-
tion of inferiority, I think that moral inferiority primarily fuels the conception
of unwanted traffic.222 Viewing black people as inferior, morally or other-
wise, reflects the racial reality in which whites who disassociate themselves
from racism nonetheless "acquiesce in the larger cultural order which contin-
ues the work of racism."223 Continuing the work of racism through the social-
cultural construction of blacks and other nonwhites as unwanted traffic
articulates the new century's "metaracism" - an adverse personality disorder
219. FEAGINET AL., supra note 145, at 17.
220. See generally WHITE REIGN: DEPLOYING WHITENESS IN AMERICA (Joe L. Kincheloe
et al. eds., 1998) (discussing social-psychological construction of whiteness and how it directs
identity-based actions).
221. See text accompanying supra note 125.
222. According to David Shipler:
Taken together, beliefs about the morals of black people make up a bundle of
stereotypes that can be seen in several parts: Blacks are dishonest and are prone to
steal. They do not care enough about their children and have allowed their families
to disintegrate. They are sexually aggressive and promiscuous. And they are
violent. These are not new portraits; they date from the time of slavery. They find
reinforcement today in social ills that seem to strike black Americans with special
intensity, and they allow white people to slide easily into instant judgments about
individuals who happen to have the physical characteristics that make them "black."
SHIPLER, supra note 204, at 318.
223. JOEL KOVEL, WHIrE RACISM 212 (1970).
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that is manifested in social distance, lack of human feelings, and detach-
ment.
224
In looking at the representation of African Americans and other people
of color as unwanted traffic, I hope to have opened lines of inquiry that will
lead to a more complete description of the nature of racial discrimination (as
an aspect of racial subordination and injustice). I also hope to enable a
recognition of the need to renegotiate the terms of formal redress in light of
extralegal representations that reduce viable antidiscrimination claims to
successful defense motions to dismiss, figuratively and literally. Of all the
racial metaphors, stereotypes, and symbolic representations, the characteriza-
tion of people of color, especially blacks, as "unwanted traffic" is today's
most exclusionary racial signification. If you are deemed to be unwanted
traffic, it does not matter if you are driving a used Ford or a new Mercedes.
It does not matter if you are window shopping or about to charge your Plati-
num American Express card. It does not matter if you have dropped out of
high school or graduated from Harvard or Oxford. It does not matter if you
speak accented or unaccented English. If you are unwanted traffic, you cannot
transform yourself into something else that is acceptable. You can be re-
routed, detoured, and stopped while driving black (brown or beige). The
police can beat you with their "nigger-be-good" stick or shoot you when you
reach for your wallet. While awaiting a taxi, you are even unwanted traffic
to empty cabs that pass you by. Unwanted traffic cannot be integrated or
incorporated into the community of those who complain about it. There can
be no unwanted traffic in crowded places, no unwanted traffic at the Univer-
sity of Texas or Cal Berkeley's Law School. No unwanted traffic will over-
come the inviolability of the glass ceiling. The contexts for treating people
of color as unwanted traffic are unlimited, and there is no way, really, for
them to become something else in the eyes of many.
Thus, at the end of the day, I recall Derrick Bell's admonition that civil
rights advocates must seek "to deflect and frustrate" the many manifestations
of the real role that racism plays in our society.225 We must break free of the
contradictory adherence to an "equality ideology [that rejects] discriminatory
experience. "" We must reconstruct and re-present unwanted traffic as the
human beings that they really are, as members of society who deserve a fair
shot at living their lives as part of the larger humanity within this nation.
Dismissing them as unwanted traffic - people who heretofore have been
224. See id. at 211-30 (considering phenomenon of metaracism in context of psychohistory
of American racism).
225. BELL, supra note 117, at 80.
226. Id.
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unjustly regulated through control and exclusion and who have been dehu-
manized into something else - says more about our society and culture than
it does about them. Reversing this old problem suggests the directions for the
new century - an America of racial comity and common humanity.
Because Thurgood Marshall's dissent in City of Memphis v. Greene
inspired this Article I close with a reference to him. For many African Ameri-
cans, Justice Marshall continues to inspire, even though many of our legiti-
mate hopes of justice through law are now either on hold or in retreat. Now,
more than ever, we must continue to do as he did and dream as he did, adopt-
ing his "defiantly hopeful" stance and his "heroic imagination."' 7 In early
1992, he received the American Bar Association's highest award, and, from
his wheelchair, he still stood taller than most of us. He concluded his accep-
tance remarks by quoting a poem by Langston Hughes, his college class-
mate.'m I respectfully conclude this Article the same way:
0, let America be America again -
The land that never has been yet -
And yet must be - the land where every man is free.
The land that's mine - the poor man's, Indian's, Negro's, ME -
Who made America,
Whose sweat and blood, whose faith and pain,
Whose hand at the foundry, whose flow in the rain,
Must bring back our mighty dream again ....
0, yes,
I say it plain,
America never was America to me,
And yet, I swear this oath -
America will be
229
227. BALL, supra note 113, at 387.
228. JUAN WnIIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUrIONARY 395 (1998).
229. Id. (quoting Langston Hughes poem "Let America Be America Again").
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